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The purpose of this thesis is to introduce and analyze Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) 
conceptions of power (pouvoir) and violence (violence). Foucault wrote extensively 
about power, but seldomly analyzed violence analytically. Nevertheless he argues that 
power and violence are connected. This thesis is an attempt to gain an understanding 
of the relation between power and violence and to open the field for questions on 
resistance. 
 
The questions of this thesis are approached through conceptual analysis and 
historical investigation. The main literature consists of Foucault’s mid-70s works; from 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality: Volume One to his lecture series 
at Collège de France, especially ”Society Must Be Defended” and Security, Territory, 
Population. Works on Foucault that are cited include Jeffrey Nealon’s Foucault 
Beyond Foucault (2008), Kai Alhanen’s Practices of Thought in Michel Foucault’s 
Philosophy (2012) and Johanna Oksala’s Foucault, Politics, and Violence (2012). 
 
Power is mainly approached through the concepts of cost and intensity, stressing 
Foucault’s famous claim that ”power produces”, or that it is productive in itself. In 
contrast to power, violence is, according to Foucault, unproductive or even destructive 
in its effects. In order to understand how the concept of cost and the process of 
intensifying are interconnected with historical changes and the corresponding use of 
violence, Foucault’s accounts on different historical modes of power are introduced 
and examined. This examination shows that historically the use of violence has 
developed from being excessive and brutal (the sovereign’s ”Right of Death”) to 
normative and life-preserving (the bio-political ”Power over Life”). 
 
The analysis shows that power and violence have a certain, historically contingent 
connection, which is perceived through the hegemonic political rationalities. According 
to Foucault, in order to resist violence, it is essential to understand the rationalities in 
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In this thesis I will introduce and analyze Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) 
conceptions of power (pouvoir) and violence (violence). By means of 
conceptual analysis of Foucault’s published books, interviews, articles and 
lecture series, I will try to gain an understanding of Foucault’s account of the 
rationalities of power and violence and to investigate the relation between 
these two concepts. For this thesis the most important question is: how is 
power related to violence in Foucault’s thought? Apart from Johanna Oksala’s 
recent book Foucault, Politics, and Violence (2012) very little academic 
attention has been directed towards the question of violence in Foucault’s 
thought.1 Nevertheless, as I will proceed to show, the concept plays an 
important role in his philosophy. 
 
I have been occupied with the philosophical question of violence for most of 
my studies. I stumbled upon the question more or less by accident. This 
happened while writing my first seminar work on the ideological battle between 
Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin in 1930s Soviet Union, where Stalin, the 
brutal dictator, had already established a firm foothold on the newly emerged 
socialist state. It came to me as a surprise that although there were evidently 
more ”humane” alternatives to the Stalinist model – like that of Bukharin’s 
militant optimism – they all seemed to share the view that violence should be 
used to pave the way for the communist utopia. Studying the history of the 
Soviet Union presented the problem of violence very vividly, and made me 
wonder whether, although traditionally held as opposite ideologies, there really 
were any significant differences in the mode of operation between Nazi-
Germany and the Soviet Union, the two great totalitarian regimes of the 20th 
century. 
 
                                                 
1
 Also Beatrice Hanssen’s book Critique of Violence – Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory 
(2000) makes an inquiry on Foucault’s conception of violence as a part of a wider critique. 
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Something that is called ’violence’ certainly plays a part also in liberal 
democracies and the legitimate use of it is a source of constant political 
debate. Strangely enough, the question of the philosophical foundations of the 
phenomena of violence has not aroused the attention of contemporary 
philosophers. In my inquiries I have come across only one philosophical 
anthology on the topic, Vittorio Bufachi’s Violence: A Philosophical Anthology 
(2009). It seems that the vaguely defined but definitely real phenomenon of 
violence in societies is very seldom analytically questioned in Western 
philosophy. Why does violence seem to be taken as a self-evident fact in the 
modern political reality? How can normative theories on the justification or 
legitimation of violence be built without even understanding what violence is? 
 
The Russian revolutionaries, who opposed the tsarist regime, used violence as 
an instrument to get rid of the people standing in the way of a better and 
perhaps eventually less violent and more ”rational” society. But after a bloody 
civil war and years of internal struggles, the revolutionaries found themselves 
stuck in the same mechanisms of power that the revolution was supposed to 
get rid of. Perhaps Foucault’s words in his 1978 lecture ”What is Critique?” 
could also have been uttered by a dissident veteran of the Soviet revolution: 
 
”For all the claim that our social and economic organization lacked rationality, we 
found ourselves facing I don’t know if it’s too much or too little reason, but in any case 
surely facing too much power. For all the praises we lavished on the promises of the 
revolution, I don’t know if it is a good or a bad thing where it actually occurred, but we 
found ourselves faced with the inertia of a power which was maintaining itself 
indefinitely. And for all our vindication of the opposition between ideologies of violence 
and the veritable scientific theory of society, that of the proletariat and of history, we 
found ourselves with two forms of power that resembled each other like two brothers: 
Fascism and Stalinism.” (PT, 54.) 
 
To put it in poetic terms, maybe the veteran would ask himself: ”Was it all that 
violence against our enemies that killed our revolution?” 
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Paul Veyne (1978, 217)2 quotes Foucault, joking darkly: ”The decisive test for 
the philosophers of Antiquity was their capacity to produce sages... in the 
modern era, it is their aptitude to make sense of massacres. The first helped 
men to support their own death, the second, to accept that of others.” Indeed, 
the more I tried to make sense of the appalling massacres of the 20th century, 
the more critically I had to look on the rationality and history of modern 
societies. In a 1977 interview Foucault explains how the European experience 
of fascism and Stalinism, their lingering shadows, were influencing his 
investigations in power: 
 
”[I]t started with a series of events and experiences since 1968 involving psychiatry, 
delinquency, the schools etc. These events themselves could never have taken their 
direction and intensity without the two gigantic shadows of fascism and Stalinism 
looming in the background. If the workers’ misery [...] caused the political thinking of 
the 19
th
 century to revolve around the economy, then fascism and Stalinism [...] induce 
political anxiety in our current societies.” (PPC, 119.) 
 
The inability to grasp the violent rationalities of these ”gigantic shadows” was 
what essentially led me to study Foucault’s thought. This thesis is an attempt 
to understand the rationalities behind violence. I am well aware of the almost 
hopelessly vast task of making an overall critique on violence. As Beatrice 
Hanssen remarks: 
 
”Surely, a book dedicated to violence as such would have to be broad. It would be the 
largest possible global encyclopedia of human atrocities, systems of domination, 
oppression, and exploitation, without regard for national borders or cultural 
particularisms.” (Hanssen 2000, 8.) 
 
To deal with violence as such, is not the aim of this thesis. Instead I will keep 
my scope strictly on Foucault’s account of certain aspects of the relation 
between power and violence. In my opinion, his thought offers a privileged 
standpoint from which to address the issue of a philosophical understanding of 
violence. As I will proceed to show in the following chapters, Foucault’s unique, 
essentially historical, approach to the question of power makes it possible to 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Paras 2006, 88. 
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shed light on the question of violence as well. As I will argue, it is possible to 
approach the concept of power in Foucault through the notions of force (force), 
cost and intensity. In the framework of these notions I will analyze the 
productive aspect of power. This aspect will be contrasted with the analysis of 
the non-productive, or destructive, rationalities behind violence. I agree with 
Beatrice Hanssen on the view that Foucault was not interested in all possible 
forms of violence. 
 
”To some degree, Foucault […] focused on state-sponsored and state-sanctioned 
institutional forms of violence, such as systems of surveillance, regimes of disciplining, 
and the advent of the modern penal system. But he also did decidedly more by shifting 
to the surreptitious manifestations that riddle civic space.” (Hanssen 2000, 10.) 
 
Adopting Hanssen’s view on violence in Foucault’s thought will help me to 
demarcate violence as a political phenomenon. I will show how power and 
violence are connected in different power relations, such as the relation 
between the sovereign and his subordinate, and give historical examples of the 
manifestations of these relations. In the last chapters I will analyze what 
Hanssen describes as ”surreptitious manifestations” when analyzing the role of 
violence in pastoral and bio-political forms of power as well as Foucault’s 
account of the relations between violence and what he calls ’discourse’. 
 
I will start this inquiry in the following two chapters by describing the main 
points of Foucault’s philosophical project. In chapter three I will take a brief 
look at Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches. In chapters 
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 I will examine Foucault’s ideas concerning power, and then, in 
chapter 5.1, focus attention on what he calls governing. In the chapters 5.2 and 
5.3 I will use the sovereign and pastoral modes of power as a reference point 
of historically specific modes of governing and examine the role that violence 
plays in them. This will be followed in chapter 5.4 by an inquiry into Foucault’s 
concept of bio-politics and its normalizing function. In chapter 6.1 I will 
compare Foucault’s conception of violence to those of Hannah Arendt and 
Slavoj Žižek. This will be followed in chapter 6.2 by an analysis on the relation 
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between the subject and violence. In the last chapter I will take a brief look at 
the possibility of resistance in Foucault’s thought. 
 
The main literature for this thesis is made up of works Foucault wrote in mid-
70s; from Discipline and Punish (French original, Surveiller et Punir: Naissance 
de la Prison, published in 1975) and The History of Sexuality: Volume One 
(Histoire de la Sexualité: La Volonté de Savoir, 1976) to his lecture series at 
Collège de France, especially ”Society Must Be Defended” (1975–1976) and 
Security, Territory, Population (1977–1978). In order to describe Foucault’s 
approach and examine the changes in his thought, I will also quote his earlier 
works The Archaeology of Knowledge (L'archéologie du Savoir, 1969) and 
History of Madness (Folie et déraison: Histoire de la Folie à L'âge Classique, 
1961). As an addition, I will use many interviews and articles published in 
Power/Knowledge - Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1977 (1980) 
and in the posthumously published tripartite compilation series, Essential 
Works of Foucault (1997–2000). As for works on Foucault, Jeffrey Nealon’s 
Foucault Beyond Foucault (2008), Kai Alhanen’s Practices of Thought in 
Michel Foucault’s Philosophy (2012) and Johanna Oksala’s Foucault, Politics, 
and Violence (2012) have provided valuable insight on different aspects of 
Foucault’s thought. The chapters dealing with Foucault’s conception of 
violence in Thomas Flynn’s book Sartre, Foucault and the Historical Reason 
(2005) and Beatrice Hanssen’s Critique of Violence – Between 
Poststructuralism and Critical Theory (2000) served as a great reference point. 
Also the works on Foucault by Gilles Deleuze and Eric Paras’ provocative 
book, Foucault 2.0 (2006), have been a source of inspiration for this thesis.
 11 
2 Foucault, Politics and Philosophy 
 
Foucault has been highly influential in modern politico-philosophical thought by 
analyzing power through discourses, practices and techniques, which 
penetrate all spheres of societies. However, before coming to the point of 
explicitly examining power, Foucault studied the multifarious events and 
processes that shape our thought and create what we call ’knowledge’. 
Foucault was interested in the connection between knowledge and power, 
which served as the basis for his criticism on universal truths concerning 
human nature and the violent mechanisms of normalization. Foucauldian 
analysis leads us not to the question of ”who holds the knowledge” or ”who has 
the power”, but to ask questions about how knowledge is formed and what kind 
of practices direct the course of action of individuals and societies. 
 
Foucault’s vast literary heritage – his books, articles, interviews and lectures, 
forming his oeuvre – is dealing with countless topics from a wide range of 
themes including knowledge, power, aesthetics and ethics. He also gave 
numerous interviews and wrote critical articles to French newspapers, such as 
the social-democratic weekly magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, in which he 
examined philosophical and political topics such as class struggle, war and the 
Gulag. (Miller 1993, 296) The abundance of material gives room for varying 
and often interdisciplinary approaches, but also poses challenges in terms of 
the selection of sources. Almost 30 years after his death, Foucault is perhaps 
more popular than ever among scholars from varying fields. On the other hand, 
the aims and presupposition of his unique historico-philosophical project are a 
source of constant debate among Foucault scholars, who mainly tend to place 
Foucault’s thought in post-structuralist or post-phenomenological framework or 
try to apply it to new fields of study. (Alhanen 2012, 3) 
 
Foucault himself had his reservations concerning the concept of scientific 
discipline and he never wanted to define himself as a member of a certain 
scientific community. Although Foucault held a chair at the Collège de France 
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with the title ‘History of Systems of Thought’, he never defined himself 
specifically as a historian, philosopher or sociologist. Denying specific 
academic roles was in fact very characteristic of Foucault. For example, when 
speaking about his Kantian stance on social critique in ”What is Critique?” 
Foucault remarks, half-seriously: ”I am not attempting to recoup Kant’s entire 
critical project in all its philosophical rigor... I would not allow myself to do so 
before such an audience of philosophers, since I myself am not a philosopher 
and barely a critic.” (PT, 49) Nevertheless, Foucault’s thought has been 
applied to a wide variety of academic fields, including philosophy, sociology, 
political and literary studies and even geography.3 
 
Foucault’s work always had a lively connection with contemporary political 
events. He was deeply influenced by the European student uprisings of 1968 
and wrote passionately about the prison revolts in France in the early 1970s, 
as well as the Iranian revolution in 1979. Foucault’s listeners in the lectures 
series at Collège de France were mesmerized by his peculiar ability to use 
history as a reflection of contemporary reality. As the English series editor 
Arnold Davidson says in his introduction to the Security, Territory, Population 
lectures: ”He could speak of Nietzsche or Aristotle, of expert psychiatric 
opinion or the Christian pastoral, but those who attended his lectures always 
took from what he said a perspective on the present and contemporary 
events.” (Davidson 2004, xv)  
 
With his oeuvre, Foucault is opening a flexible field of study. Foucault stated: 
 
”I am an experimenter and not a theorist. I call a theorist someone who constructs a 
general system, [...] and applies it to different fields in a uniform way. That isn’t my 
case. I’m an experimenter in a sense that I write in order to change myself and in order 
not to think the same thing as before.” (EW3, 240.) 
 
The experimental nature of Foucault’s thought indeed makes it challenging to 
build a coherent picture of his philosophy. Eric Paras claims that Foucault was 
                                                 
3 See ”Questions on Geography”. (P/K, 63-77) 
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sometimes criticized for this. (Paras 2006, 32-33) Foucault answers to an 
imaginary critic in The Archaeology of Knowledge: 
 
”What, do you imagine that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not 
preparing - with a rather shaky hand - a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can 
move my discourse[,] [...] in which I can lose myself[.] I am no doubt not the only one 
who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain 
the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order.” 
(AK, 17.) 
 
Jeffrey Nealon believes that Foucault’s dream was to be a ”high-modernist 
impersonality”, to attain a certain anonymity in the face of a society which 
bases all of its functions as well as its ethics on faces and identities. (Nealon 
2008, 75) In a 1980 interview Foucault says that he chose anonymity ”[o]ut of 
nostalgia for a time when, being quite unknown, what I said had some chance 
of being heard. [...] The effects of the book might land in unexpected places 
and form shapes I had never thought of. A name makes reading too easy.” 
(EW1, 321) Thus, the often quoted phrase, ”I am no doubt not the only one 
who writes in order to have no face” suggests that Foucault’s thought should 
never be understood through his personality, his ”face”, but be used as it is: a 
literary piece, a series of ideas, a toolbox for a philosopher; or perhaps as a 
weapon for the revolutionary. In fact he claimed that the societal process of 
denying ”who we are individually” and instead imposing a scientifically backed 
identity, a ”face”, to everyone is part of what he calls ”economic and ideological 
state violence”. In a 1982 article Foucault says: 
 
”[A]ll these present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we? They are 
refusal of these abstractions of economic and ideological state violence, which ignore 
who we are individually, and also a refusal of scientific or administrative inquisition that 
determines who one is.” (EW3, 331.) 
 
I will argue that for Foucault identifying this ”administrative inquisition” with its 
rationalities and resisting its functionings is part of the struggle to resist 
violence as well. I will come back to the question of resistance in the final 
chapter.  




Foucault’s description of his project – or rather an advice to his readers – 
reminds me of Wittgenstein’s famous paragraph in which he advised the 
reader to use his Tractatus logico-philosophicus as ladders, of which one can, 
and indeed should, get rid of when reaching the destination. (Wittgenstein 
2010, 90) As an addition, for Foucault, philosophy can have a radical mission 
of acting against established power relations. ”Maybe philosophy can still play 
a role on the side of counter-power, on condition [...] that it gives itself the task 
of analyzing, elucidating, making visible, and thereby intensifying the struggles 
that take place around power.” (Foucault 1978, 540)4 
 
I have so far explained why the topic of violence is of great personal interest to 
me as well as briefly analyzed the starting points of Foucault’s philosophy as 
well as the influence he has had on scholars in varying fields. Next, in order to 
understand the way the historical material Foucault uses is connected to his 
philosophy, I will proceed to take a brief look at his archaeological and 
genealogical approaches
                                                 
4 Quoted in STP, 374. 
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3 Archaeology and Genealogy 
 
Foucault’s thought is strongly connected with the way he uses historical 
material. The concepts of power and violence have for Foucault a historically 
contingent rationality, which could be analyzed only through rigorous historical 
approach. Also, as mentioned in the previous chapter, philosophy can, in 
Foucault’s view, have the radical mission of unveiling and challenging the 
rationalities of power relations. In order to do this, one has to approach history 
in a certain manner. 
 
In the starting lines of The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault describes what 
he saw was the method of historians of his time: 
 
”For many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, 
as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the 
stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible 
processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force, 
and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the movements of 
accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional 
history has covered with a thick layer of events.” (AK, 3.) 
 
Whether Foucault’s description is accurate or not, adopting a historical stance 
like this would hinder the possibility to understand power and violence as 
historically contingent phenomenons. If in fact history is constructed of long 
periods, of which the historian is studying in order to ”reveal the stable, almost 
indestructible system of checks and balances”, then it follows that the 
phenomenon of violence, for instance, is an inevitable result of a continuous 
historical process. In the next chapters I will argue that this is not the case. 
 
Foucault approaches different modes of power and forms his conception of 
violence through unique historical approaches, of which archaeology and 
genealogy are of great importance for the questions dealt with in this thesis. 
In order to grasp how Foucault forms his ideas, I will in this chapter briefly 
explain the main points of these approaches. 




After releasing his tide shifting work on human sciences, The Order of Things 
(Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines, 1966) 
Foucault received fierce criticism, especially from Sartre, who accused him of 
lacking precision and originality. (Sartre 1966, 87-88)5 Partly as an answer to 
his critics, Foucault wrote The Archaeology of Knowledge in which he studied 
the conditions of possibility of knowledge from a historical point of view. (Paras 
2006, 31) Kai Alhanen argues that The Archaeology of Knowledge is, however, 
not a historical investigation: 
 
”Instead, it is Foucault’s examination and elaboration of the philosophical 
underpinnings and methodology that shape and inform his historical work. Therefore 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is both a postscript to Foucault’s earlier investigations 
and an attempt to develop a new approach to the study of discourses.” (Alhanen 2012, 
38-39.) 
 
In the book Foucault introduces series of highly elusive concepts, such as the 
statement and discourse. In this chapter I will try to explain how Foucault uses 
these concepts and the relation these concepts have to his archaeological 
approach. 
 
As a philosopher who’s reflecting his ideas toward a historical background, 
Foucault was well aware of the methodological problems he was facing. These 
include, for instance, the selection, relevance and coherence of the body of 
documents to be used, the choice of the level of analysis and questions of 
interpretation. He argues that these problems are part of the methodological 
field of history. (AK, 10-12.) Foucault was highly critical of the given unities of 
any particular discipline, including history. He poses the question of whether 
the quite recent categories of ’politics’ or ’literature’, for instance, can be 
accepted as such, since there are major problems in applying them outside of 
the current historical context. (ibid, 22) From a Foucauldian point of view, it is 
not possible to talk about politics of the Classical period in the same sense as 
we talk about politics of the 21st century. For Foucault’s project it is absolutely 
                                                 
5 Quoted in Paras 2006, 31. 
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essential to challenge these unities and show their lack of internal coherence 
and dependence on authority. 
 
”These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without 
question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but 
the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they 
do not come about themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of 
which must be known, and the justification of which must be scrutinized.” (AK, 26.) 
 
Foucault uses these given unities only insofar as to study them, to understand 
their ”secretly formed laws”. Therefore he does not place himself inside of 
these unities, defined by the discipline in question, more than is absolutely 
necessary to build a theory of them. (AK, 26.) So, with minimal interpretation, 
these discourses are used as raw material. ”One is led therefore to the project 
of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for the 
unities that form within.” (ibid, 26-27) 
 
Foucault makes clear that his approach is not that of language analysis. While 
language analysis asks the question of the rules of a certain statement and is 
trying to find out how, by using these rules, it would be possible to produce 
similar kinds of statements, ”[t]he description of the events of discourse poses 
a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared 
rather than another?” (AK, 27) Paras claims that for the archaeologist ”[t]he 
history of knowledge was the unfolding of an anonymous process: a process of 
the formation and transformation of bodies of statements according to isolable 
rules.” (Paras 2006, 35) 
 
Perhaps the most central concept of The Archaeology of Knowledge is that of 
discourse (discours), which Foucault defines, quite simply, as ”the group of 
statements that belong to a single system of formation.” (AK, 107) Discourses 
are therefore groups of statements which are governed by certain unwritten set 
of rules. In order to study discourses, it is important to focus attention on the 
form of statement, its field of application and the position of the one who 
enunciates it. Thus, when in History of Madness Foucault quotes the 
statements of early psychiatrists about the conditions of the madmen, 
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published in official annals, he is making an archaeological study on the 
discursive practices of madness in that particular historical period. 
 
Alhanen claims that for Foucault archaeology is not just an arbitrary metaphor. 
(Alhanen 2012, 55) The archeologist works in an excavation in hope of finding 
remains and artifacts of an ancient civilization. By putting fragmented pieces 
together she is trying to build a coherent picture of the changes and 
fluctuations in that civilization. She is not interested in the question of what the 
maker of this or that artifact had in mind while producing it. Instead the key 
point of interest is the way the artifacts were produced and the materials that 
were used. In a similar manner, an archaeologist of knowledge studies the 
history of thought: by putting together statements, organizing them into groups 
and trying to spot regularities between them she is trying to figure out the 
building materials, the rules, of these statements. (ibid, 55-56.) The 
archaeologist is studying the transformation of civilizations, the archaeologist 
of knowledge the transformation of systems of knowledge. 
 
Beatrice Hanssen claims: ”Foucault’s archeological [sic] excavations were 
aimed at the sedimentary strata of occidental knowledge, meaning to lay bare 
its topography, architecture, or spatial regimes of ordering systems.” (Hanssen 
2000, 42) Thus, the aim of archaeological analysis is to show the systems of 
thought ”laid bare” without layers of interpretation and meanings and thus 
opens the field for a critical study. When history is no longer seen as an 
”indestructible system of checks and balances” it is possible to see how 
ordering systems have developed and enables the archaeologist to ask 
questions on the reasons why certain rationalities have become accepted as 
part of the accepted discourse instead of others. 
 
After The Archaeology of Knowledge a major shift took place in Foucault’s thought. In 
Foucault’s vocabulary there was suddenly a new concept that borrowed its name from 
Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals (1967). Eric Paras remarks: 
 
”It is one of the ironies of Foucault’s career that the towering edifice assembled with infinite 
care and labour in The Archaeology of Knowledge was essentially given over to dereliction 
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immediately upon its completion. Foucault never applied the rigorous formal method that he 
christened ”archaeology”; indeed, after 1970, he rarely even used the word.” (Paras 2006, 10.) 
 
I would argue that what Paras calls a ’towering edifice’ – Foucault’s meticulously built 
system, by which he locates his level of analysis – was created to deal with certain 
kinds of questions. But since by the mid-70s Foucault was already dealing with 
different questions than five years earlier, a new approach was needed. Thus, 
contrary to Paras’ view, archaeology was not completely forgotten and left behind. 
Instead, as Foucault insists in ”What is Critique”, it works contemporaneously with 
genealogy as another dimension in the same analysis. (PT, 65) Moreover, the 
genealogical approach resembles archaeology in its opposition to the scientific way of 
locking knowledges to a certain power-hierarchy, that is, making some statements 
appear rather than other. 
 
In Society Must Be Defended Foucault explains genealogy in the following terms: 
 
”Compared to the attempt to inscribe knowledges in the power-hierarchy typical of science, 
genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or 
in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, 
and scientific theoretical discourse. The project of these disorderly and tattered genealogies is 
to reactivate local knowledges. [...] To put it in a nutshell: Archaeology is the method specific to 
the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described 
these local discursivities, bring into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released 
from them.” (SMD, 10-11.) 
 
This is essentially what Foucault is doing in Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality: Volume One. He does not not merely describe the penal practices or the 
birth of what is called ’sexuality’. Instead Foucault opens a new critical field that can 
be used to study the effects of these practices on what he calls subjectivation, the 
forming of individuality through power relations. This is what Foucault means when he 
says that the aim of genealogy is to ”bring into play the desubjugated knowledges”. 
With the help of the genealogical approach, it is possible to desubjugate, to change, 
and perhaps to free, the power-relations that are in operation whenever knowledge – 
and through that knowledge, subjects – are formed. 
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In Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality: Volume One, Foucault, for the 
first time, explicitly shows how power-knowledge forms and shapes the subjects. 
Unlike the biblical term genesis, genealogy is not trying to find some fundamental 
starting point from which all further developments have emerged. Instead it is 
”something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity 
born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the 
effect.” (PT, 64) In Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Foucault is 
recreating the historical conditions for the appearance of such ever-changing and 
subject-swallowing categories as the ’delinquent’ or the ’pervert’, for instance. If the 
archaeological question in The Archaeology of Knowledge is: ”How is it that one 
particular statement appeared rather than another” (AK, 27), the genealogical 
question in The History of Sexuality is: ”What paths have brought us to the point 
where we are ”at fault” with respect to our own sex?” (HSI, 9) 
 
This short introduction on Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches will 
serve as a basis for understanding how Foucault dealt with historical material. In the 
later chapters I will argue that the questions of the appearance of certain statements 
rather than another or becoming ”at fault” with respect to our own sex are – through 
the effects language has on the subject and through the normalizing function of the 
discourse on sex – fundamentally connected with Foucault’s conception of violence.
 4 Power and Violence 
 
4.1 Foucault and the Question of Power 
 
Foucault deals explicitly with the theoretical background of his conceptions of 
power in the main corpus of his work only in a few, relatively short passages in 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality: Volume One. (Nealon 
2008, 97) Luckily, more material can be found from the numerous articles and 
interviews where Foucault explains and clarifies his ideas on power. He 
approached the theme from different perspectives during his lifetime but the 
question of power was always strongly present in his work. Although above 
mentioned books, both written in mid-70s, are perhaps Foucault’s most often 
quoted works on power, in a 1977 interview Foucault says that also his earlier 
works, such as his doctoral thesis, History of Madness, were at least indirectly 
devoted to the topic. (P/K, 115) Foucault further elaborates that it was the 
political situation in France in the early 1960s that made it so difficult for him to 
pose the question of power directly. He explains how his generation was 
brought up in the French orthodox Marxist tradition, which viewed power 
mainly as a property of the ruling class and used as an instrument of class 
domination and violence against the proletariat. He claims that among the 
French Marxists power was mostly posed in terms of the capitalist or bourgeois 
State apparatus. (ibid, 115-116.) 
 
Foucault’s early teacher Louis Althusser, a distinguished Marxist philosopher 
who had a major influence on young Foucault (Miller 1993, 57), was an 
exception among the French Marxists in the sense that in his view power is not 
merely repressive. He divides the functions of what he calls ’apparatuses’ in 
two categories: Ideological State Apparatuses, such as the educational 
institution, and Repressive State Apparatuses, such as the military and the 
police. Nevertheless, Althusser perceives power’s functionings mainly through 
the State and the ruling classes: ”The State is a ’machine’ of repression, which 
enables the 
 




ruling classes to ensure the domination over the working class, thus enabling 
the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion[.]” 
(Althusser 2008, 11) Foucault joined the French Communist party under the 
influence of Althusser (EW3, 250), but resigned soon afterward. He grew 
frustrated by the fact that the French orthodox Marxists were not interested in 
questions he saw crucial for understanding power: how it was exercised or 
what kinds of techniques or tactics were employed. (P/K, 115-116) 
 
I will next move to the topic of power. I will start by briefly considering the 
relation between the concepts of power and force. Understanding this relation 
and Foucault’s usage of the word ’force’ is important in relation to Foucault’s 
concept of violence. After this I will analyze Foucault’s critique on the Marxist 
view on power and proceed to approach power through the concepts of cost 
and intensity, which, in my opinion, illuminate the question of how power 
functions and why it has taken certain historical forms. In the last pages of this 
chapter I will introduce Foucault’s concept of governing and his account of 
three historical modes of power. Lastly, I will examine Foucault’s concept of 
bio-politics. 
 
4.2 Force, Cost and Intensity 
 
In Foucault’s view, it is misleading to pose the question of power merely in 
terms of the State apparatus as the French orthodox Marxists did. (P/K, 115-
116.) Instead power is intrinsic to all social relations; it functions in a social 
space between actors: individuals, groups of people or classes. This is why, in 
order to understand power’s immense role in our social relations, it is 
misleading to asks questions like ”who has the power” or ”where is power 
exercised”; the visible level of the functioning of power is merely the tip of the 
iceberg. One has to dive deeper to figure out the existential level of power: 
how individuals, groups of people or classes are formed by power’s 
functionings. Instead of independently constituted subjects – such as the 




members of the ruling class – exercising power on others, power in fact 
constitutes these subjects and controls their conduct. 
 
There is an important relation between the concepts of power and force in 
Foucault’s thought. Johanna Oksala notes that Foucault uses the notion of 
force in elusive and often contradictory ways. Sometimes he uses the concept 
to describe something that can be possessed, a tool or a weapon in the 
struggles that happen around power. On the other hand Foucault was often 
referring to “relations of force”, which echoes the Marxist notion of relations of 
production. (Oksala 2012, 45.) Kai Alhanen, following Deleuze, claims that 
Foucault understands force as capacities of action. People have the capacity 
to labor, exercise, study, imagine, and so forth. When power is exercised, 
these forces of humans are directed and governed in a certain domain. 
Alhanen further claims: “Power can be also used strategically, namely by 
assembling and directing relations of force towards some specific goal in a 
centralized fashion on the level of society as a whole.” (Alhanen 2012, 118-
119.) 
 
When power is “put into action”, it acts on the capacities of action. Or as 
Deleuze puts it, ”power is a relation between forces, or rather every relation 
between forces is a ’power relation’.” (Deleuze 2010, 59.) Power directs the 
forces, the acting capacities of its subjects. For example, the armed forces can 
be detached to help in a humanitarian catastrophe. The capacities of soldiers 
can be used to save people from their flooded houses. But in a similar manner, 
the soldiers can be ordered to destroy an enemy village and kill all of its 
inhabitants. 
 
What Foucault undoubtedly got as an influence from the Marxist tradition (or 
rather from the works of Marx) is the view that the historically significant 
changes in economic and political relations that happened from the 16th and 
17th centuries onwards have had a major impact in the exercise of power. As 
new capitalist, or industrious societies emerged, questions of the organization 
of production arose on the agenda of economic and political debate. As 




Foucault notes: ”Techniques of power are invented to meet the demands of 
production. I mean production here in the broad sense - it can be a matter of 
the ’production’ of destruction, as with the army.” (P/K, 161) 
 
Since, in Marxist terms, production of surplus value is one of the basic 
attributes of a capitalist economy, and the various techniques of power are 
invented to meet the demands of production, I would argue that what Foucault 
is basically saying is that certain modes of power are intrinsic to capitalist 
economy. However, it is important to note that Foucault does not use the 
notion of a ’capitalist economy’ to mark a difference with a socialist or 
communist economy. He uses the words ’capitalist’ and ’industrial’ almost 
synonymously, and designates these definitions to describe the birth of an 
essentially modern economy. (HSI, 69; SMD, 277-278) Whether it is 
historically accurate to do so is debatable, but in my opinion Foucault’s 
tendency to equate these two words is meant to highlight the fact that 
capitalism was born in the wake of Industrious Revolution and has since more 
or less been the dominant way of organizing production. 
 
Contrary to the French orthodox Marxist notion of the State apparatus as a 
mechanism invented intentionally by the bourgeoisie to repress the working 
class, Foucault held the view that power works in economy nonintentionally. 
He insists that power is not in the hands of people who make important 
economic or political decisions. (HSI, 95) However, in his 1975–1976 lecture 
series Society Must Be Defended, Foucault notes how, at a certain historical 
moment, certain techniques of power – the exclusion of madmen to asylums, 
for instance – became politically, or even economically profitable. This is why 
the bourgeoisie invested in those techniques – not because they would care 
how the madmen were treated – but because the technique of treating 
madmen in a certain way became, for various reasons, profitable. (SMD, 32-
33) 
 
”[T]o the extent that these notions of ”the bourgeoisie” and ”the interest of bourgeoisie” 
probably have no content, [...] what we have to realize is precisely that there was no 
such thing as a bourgeoisie that thought madness should be excluded[.] [B]ut there 




were mechanisms to exclude madness[.] At a given moment, and for reasons that 
have to be studied, they generated a certain economic profit, a certain political utility, 
and they were therefore colonized and supported by global mechanisms and, finally, 
by the entire system of the State.” (SMD, 33.) 
 
As one can see, Foucault is not at all clear on the details or the mechanisms of 
operation behind this ”interest of the bourgeoisie” and is even skeptical of this 
kind of notion. However, in my opinion, with this notion, Foucault highlights the 
idea the the scientific discouses that define madness and the practices that 
exclude the subjects that fall into this category, are unintentional, but, 
historically speaking, they have had a tendency to increase in their 
productivity, or to be more accurate, to be productive in themselves. Scientific 
practices, such as psychiatry, produce knowledge as well as applied 
categories or taxonomies, such as the ”madman” who stand in a striking 
contrast to the ”mentally healthy”. This process can flow in profits to the ones 
who invest in it, but this does not mean that the ones investing are in charge of 
the overall changes in power relations. Deleuze argues: 
 
”As the postulate of essence or of the attribute, power would have an essence and be 
an attribute, which would qualify those who possess it (dominators) as opposed to 
those on whom it is practiced (dominated). Power has no essence; it is simply 
operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is the possible set of 
possible relations between forces, which passes through the dominated forces no less 
than through the dominating, as both of these forces constitute unique elements[.]” 
(Deleuze 2010, 24.) 
 
Following Deleuze, I would argue that investing to the available mechanisms to 
exclude madmen did not ”buy” the bourgeoisie away from the reach of power. 
With its functionings, power can produce economic profits and political utility, 
but it also produces knowledge, categories and taxonomies and, for instance 
when applied to the military context, destruction. The set of mechanism to 
control subjects, ”does generate a bourgeois interest that functions within the 
economico-political system as a whole.” (SMD, 33) In Foucault’s view ”power 
produces; it produces reality[.]” (DP, 194) In the social reality, produced by 




power relations, the forces of the subjects of power, whether bourgeoisie or 
working class, are conducted in one way or another. 
 
I would claim that with the word ’power’, Foucault refers to a specific social 
relation and is not trying to create a complete and all-embracing theory. 
Therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a common denominator for all 
forms of power. However, sticking to the economic aspect of power, Jeffrey 
Nealon argues that it could be fruitful to approach the Foucauldian notion of 
economy and its relation to power through the concept of cost. (Nealon 2008, 
17-18) What is relevant here is that some techniques of power are more costly 
than others, both in economic and political terms. In the process of increasing 
productivity, the less costly means of implementing power tend to take over. 
 
Foucault starts Discipline and Punish with a painstakingly detailed analysis of 
public executions in 16th century France. He claims that as a form of exercising 
power, public executions became a political danger since they were costly and 
inefficient. (DP, 63.) To prove his point, Foucault uses public executions as an 
example, telling how they were a constant source of unrest and illegalities 
among the people to whom they were addressed: 
 
”It was evident that the great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by 
the very people to whom it was addressed. In fact, the terror of the public execution 
created centres of illegality: on execution days, work stopped, the taverns were full, the 
authorities were abused, insults or stones were thrown at the executioner, the guards 
and soldiers; attempts were made to seize the condemned man, either to save him or 
to kill him more surely; [...] But above all - and this was why these disadvantages 
became a political danger - the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty 
in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power[.]” 
(DP, 63.) 
 
Considering the cost of the public execution in terms of lost lives, property and 
work hours, it is a small wonder that in the end of the 18th century reformers of 
penal practices were insisting on the abolition of the executions. (DP, 63) 
Torturing and executing a criminal publicly became by any measurement too 
costly and clumsy a way to punish. However it is important to note that cost is 




not something of a natural order, but essentially socially defined criteria of 
measurement. (Nealon 2008, 17) What is considered too costly in one social 
sphere is perhaps not considered too costly at all in another. It is the rationality 
of the hegemonic political system, through which the cost of different practices 
is mirrored. Public executions, for instance, were abolished in the Western 
societies by the end of the 18th century, but some societies hold to similar 
punishment practices to this day. Obviously enough, Foucault never claimed 
that power has any universal functions, although, historically speaking, it 
seems to have shared some tendencies, at least in the Western world. 
 
It is interesting how Foucault uses the concept of cost also as something 
concerning the object of the practices of torture. He is talking about the 
offenders as ”those who paid the penalty”, which seems to refer to the offender 
as someone who, by being punished, restores the strictly economic balance 
his crime has violated – pays his dues, so to say. According to Nealon, 
Foucault borrows the concept of cost from Nietzsche’s work The Genealogy of 
Morals, where it occupies a central place. Nietzsche asks: ”Have you ever 
asked yourselves sufficiently how much the erection of every ideal on earth 
has cost?” (Nietzsche 1967, 95)6 Every ideal, indeed every truth, has its price. 
Foucault takes the question further by asking: ”At what price can subjects 
speak the truth about themselves? [...] How [does one] state the truth of 
oneself, insofar as one might be a criminal subject[?]” (EW2, 444) One can 
even claim as Nealon does that the question of the price of truth for the subject 
is Foucault’s main question, not the narrow question of power. (Nealon 2008, 
19) Foucault maintains that for the individual subject, it is possible to resist 
power, but it comes with a price. I will arrive at the topic of resistance in the last 
chapter. 
 
Nealon further argues that through the concept of intensity one can shed light 
on the historical mutations of power, such as previously mentioned reforms in 
penal practices to abolish public execution. Because of the constant tendency 
to seek more economical profit and political utility, power relations saturate. To 
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say that power intensifies is to say that more cost-efficient and wide-reaching 
power mechanisms are implemented. In their most intense form, these 
mechanisms reach everywhere, touch everyone and are almost self-sufficient 
in their cost-efficiency. It is important to notice, however, that the process of 
intensification does not happen suddenly. It is a question of slow mutations, 
draws and setbacks as well as uneven distributions of new techniques to 
support the mechanisms of power. When Foucault explains in Discipline and 
Punish the raison d’être of the penal reforms in the eighteenth century, he also 
defines a sort of a general formula for power’s intensification: (Nealon 2008, 
35, 38.) 
 
”Shift the object and scale. Define new tactics in order to reach a target that is now 
more subtle but also more widely spread in the social body. Find new techniques for 
adjusting punishment to it and for adapting its effect. Lay down new principles for 
regularizing, refining, universalizing, the art of punishing. Homogenize its application. 
Reduce its economic and political cost by increasing its effectiveness and by 
multiplying its circuits.” (DP, 89.) 
 
From these new, intensified, more cost-efficient and wide-reaching techniques, 
which slowly, starting from the 17th century, replaced the archaic and violent 
ones, such as torture and public executions, emerges what Foucault calls 
’disciplinary power’. Prisons, barracks, clinics, madhouses and other similar 
institutions were erected in the 17th and 18th centuries to exercise power in 
more intensified and less costly manner. These new techniques were 
essentially targeted to the body in a new, more meticulous and calculative way: 
 
”In the old system, the body of the condemned man became the king’s property, on 
which the sovereign left his mark and brought down the effects of his power. Now he 
will rather be the property of society, the object of collective and useful appropriation.” 
(DP, 109.) 
 
What transforms, then, when the power of the sovereign is mutating to 
disciplinary power is the relation to the human body, its usefulness for the 
productive mechanisms of the society. In short, disciplinary power targets the 
body and its utility. The word ’utility’ is interesting here. What is for Foucault the 




most intense form of disciplinary power was in fact invented by the father of the 
theory of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. The panoptic prison model, which 
Bentham designed as a mechanism and ideal of perfect surveillance, aims 
essentially to reduce the cost of the prison system and increase the utility of 
the bodies of prisoners to the maximum. In fact, Foucault argues in numerous 
instances, that utilitarianism is not a philosophy or ideology: it is a technology 
of government. (DP, 200; P-K, 148; BB, 41) 
 
I have now explained my account on the concept of ’force’ as well as its 
relation to power. I also introduced my approach to power, which is defined 
through the concepts of cost and intensity, and gave a historical example of 
the intensification process of the penal system, which started in the 17th 
century. In the next chapter I will discuss the relation between power relations 
and violence. 
 
4.3 Power Relations and Violence  
 
The chapter “The Great Confinement” in History of Madness starts with a 
curious statement: “After defusing its violence, the Renaissance had liberated 
the voice of Madness. The age of reason, in a strange takeover, was then to 
reduce it to silence” (HM, 38) The chapter, as its name suggests, describes the 
birth of the houses of confinement for the madmen, in which their violent, 
animal spirits could be locked up and concealed to be treated in various ways
from pure torture to theatrical spectacles7. I can’t help but notice Foucault’s 
tendency to romanticize the madmen, to portrait them as the “speakers of 
truth”, or his tone of moral resentment towards the merciless practices of 
torture he describes. He paints horrifying images of madmen and -women 
chained to the walls or kept on a leash for years. Foucault questions the 
                                                 
7 Foucault cites interesting anecdotes on the early attempts to bend the unreason of the madmen: ”One 
example quoted was the case of a patient who believed himself to be dead, and who was genuinely dying 
by starving him to death: ’A troop of people, pale and dressed like the dead, entered his room, set up a 
table, brought food and drink, and sat down to eat. The dying man, who was ravenous, looked on, and 
the dead expressed surprise that he was not eating, and convinced him that they ate just as much as the 
living. He quickly became accustomed to the idea.’” (HM, 331) 




necessity of these practices and strips away all intrinsic meaning of them, 
stating: 
 
“The violence of these practices demonstrates quite clearly that they were not 
governed by a consciousness of the need to punish, or by the duty to correct behavior. 
The notion of resipiscence is quite foreign to the whole system.” (HM, 147) 
 
On the other hand, Foucault does not offer any moral base from which make 
these kinds of judgments. This flaw in Foucault’s reasoning is corrected in his 
later works, but is never completely solved.8 
 
It seems that in History of Madness Foucault perceives violence as a 
manifestation of the absolute ‘unreason’ and ‘animality’ of madmen, a sort of a 
rebellion against the ‘reason’ and ‘humanity’, promoted by the Enlightenment. 
On the other hand Foucault claims that the exercise of power towards madmen 
can reach a threshold in which it transforms into violence. Thus, in History of 
Madness Foucault uses the concept of violence on the one hand to designate 
a sudden, dramatic and in a sense rebellious force and on the other an 
intensified functioning of the corrective mechanisms which sometimes can take 
brutal forms. This tension between violence as a rebellious force of individuals 
or groups and as a revelation of the “ugly face” of power remains throughout 
his oeuvre. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in Discipline and Punish Foucault 
describes the shift from the largely excessive and violent form of sovereign 
power to the more subtle and cost-efficient disciplinary system. He argues that 
the carceral system “gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in 
which it appears to be free of all excess and all violence.” (DP, 302) As I 
argued, historically speaking, it was exactly the tremendous political and 
economic cost of direct violence, mirrored through the changing political 
rationalities, which influenced the intensifying process of the mechanisms of 
power and gave birth to the carceral system to take care of the age-old 
problem of legal punishing. There are many reasons why the historical change 
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 For a more detailed analysis on the change in Foucault’s account of ethics, see Paras 2006, 149-158. 




from the violent and brutal forms of exercising power to the “gentle way in 
punishing” happened, but it is quite clear that during these shifts calculations of 
the cost of different forms of punishing were made. Foucault explains the 
reasoning as follows: 
 
“There is [...] a specifically political cost. If you are too violent, you risk provoking 
revolts. Again, if you intervene in too discontinuous a manner, you risk allowing 
politically costly phenomena of resistance and disobedience to develop in the 
interstices. This was how monarchical power operated.” (P/K, 155.) 
 
Foucault continues to claim that theorists in the 18th century were arguing that 
the violent monarchic model of exemplary punishments was too costly in 
proportion to its results. “A great expenditure of violence is made which 
ultimately only had the force of an example.” (P/K, 155) For the theorists the 
question was: Is all this costly violence necessary in order to attain our aims? 
Could there be more efficient and wide-reaching ways of punishing? In other 
words, in the name of cost-efficiency it was necessary to figure out the 
appropriate mechanisms and techniques to attain a perfect equilibrium of 
violence and other “gentler” ways of exercising power. 
 
Foucault’s account of the relation between power and violence is not 
exhaustive and is at its best ambiguous. It is also not clear what kind of part 
violence plays in Foucault’s historical analysis. Flynn asks, ”if power relations 
more often than not are accompanied by violence and yet are not identical with 
it, how does violence enter into Foucauldian history?” (Flynn 2005, 254) 
Flynn’s suggestion is that the link is knowledge, or power-knowledge relations, 
the ”instinctive violence” of the Nietzschean will to knowledge. (ibid, 255) Paras 
claims that Foucault detached himself from the notion of autonomous 
discourses and thereby aligned himself with the Nietzschean genealogy: 
 
”The genealogical imperative – to confort the past in the full knowledge that every 
”eternal truth” is a violently imposed interpretation – allowed Foucault to situate his 
formerly free-floating discourses within a conditioning structure of practices.” (Paras 
2006, 53-54.) 
 




Indeed, in his 1970 Collège de France inaugural lecture Foucault discusses 
the relation between discourses and violence. He states: “We must conceive 
discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as practice we 
impose upon them; it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the 
principle of their regularity.” (AK, 229) 
 
Alhanen claims that with discursive practice Foucault means a “socially 
stabilized manner to produce statements”, which “makes its participants talk 
about things, and also understand them, in some particular way.” (Alhanen 
2012, 55) It is very curious that Foucault says: “violence that we do to things.” 
Taking into account the central place that discursive practices play in 
Foucault’s concept of knowledge-power relations, one could argue that as 
these relations are everywhere, so is violence. Since for Foucault most power 
relations are non-violent, meaning that they direct rather than destroy 
capacities of action, this kind of claim indeed seems dubious. Although it is 
probable that Foucault used the concept of violence quite carelessly in his 
inaugural lecture, the idea that discursive practices and violence are somehow 
connected comes up in a slightly modified manner in one of Foucault’s lectures 
a few years later. 
 
In the first lecture of the 1973-1974 Psychiatric Power series Foucault explains 
in more detail his account of the institutional mode of violence. He argues that 
violence is at the heart of the rational, calculative exercise of power.  
 
“When in fact we speak of violence, and this is what bothers me about the notion, we 
always have in mind a kind of connotation of physical power, of an unregulated, 
passionate power, an unbridled power[.] This notion seems to me to be dangerous 
because, on the one hand, picking out a power that is physical, unregulated, etcetera, 
allows one to think that good power, or just simply power, power not permeated by 
violence, is not physical power. It seems to me rather that what is essential in all power 
is that ultimately its point of application is always the body. All power is physical, and 
there is a direct connection between the body and political power.” (PP, 14.) 
 
Foucault’s main concern here is that the usage of the concept of violence as 
“an unbalanced force” covers up the meticulous, calculative practices of power. 




He insists that the examples from the early asylums described in History of 
Madness show clearly that psychiatric power, which bases itself on the 
discourse of mental illnesses and functions through the body of the madman, 
are by their essence violent. “Taken in its final ramification, at its capillary level, 
where it affects the individual himself, this power is physical and, thereby, it is 
violent.” (PP, 14) Violence as a term for this is, however, misleading. “Rather 
[...] than speak of violence, I would prefer to speak of a micro-physics of 
power.” (PP, 16) 
 
Foucault deploys the term ‘micro-physics of power’ in Discipline and Punish, 
where he denotes with it the new mechanisms of power that were imposed on 
the body through the disciplinary system. 
 
“In becoming the target of new mechanisms of power, the body is offered up to new 
forms of knowledge. It is the body of exercise, rather than of speculative physics; a 
body manipulated by authority, rather than imbued with animal spirits; a body of useful 
training and not of rational mechanics, but one in which, by virtue of that very fact, a 
number of natural requirements and functional constraints are beginning to emerge.” 
(DP, 155.) 
 
To control the body’s functionings in a certain way needed not only knowledge 
of the correct end, the norm, but also exercise permeated by a notion of a 
progressing, evolutive time. This mode of controlling is what Foucault calls 
‘micro-physics of power’. “[A] micro-physics of power made possible [...] the 
integration of a temporal, unitary, continuous, cumulative dimension in the 
exercise of controls and the practice of dominations.” (DP, 160) Thus, the 
micro-physics of power is in action for example when the subjects are bended 
to the timetables and regulations of the factory, the school or the asylum. 
These small streams of everyday practices join up with each other, forming the 
mainstream of the society. Beatrice Hanssen argues: 
 
“As a micro-physics of power, Foucault’s analysis also permitted the examination of 
power’s macro-structures, to the extent that the interface between general structural, 
or institutional, power relations and micro-operators transpired as the interplay 
between strategies and tactics, meaning that the “global strategies” that “traversed and 




utilized the local tactics of domination” needed to be mapped as well.” (Hanssen 2000, 
124.) 
 
Through micro-physics of power, Foucault shows how political rationalities and 
scientific knowledge boil down to the individual body and forces it to meet the 
demands of production or political utility. Sticking to the definition of violence 
as destructive action towards the capacities of action of the subject, micro-
physics of power is not a violent mechanism in itself. In fact, at least to a 
certain degree, it is meant to increase the utility of these capacities. 
 
It is indeed important to note that the disciplinary mode of power is not in itself 
violent. Since according to Foucault, power is “a set of actions on possible 
actions” (EW3, 341), destroying subjects’ possibilities for acting by using 
violence will also make it impossible to affect her productive forces. In his 1982 
article “The Subject and Power” Foucault seems to have abandoned his, 
perhaps too hasty, equating of violence with the micro-physics of power. ”A 
relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it 
breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities.” (ibid, 340) Following 
Foucault, I argue that violence is partly so costly because it is destructive; it 
nullifies the capacities of its targets without asking for consent. Violence bends 
the acting capacities of the targets to the point where it destroys them. This 
kind of destruction is a serious hindrance to the enhancement of production 
through the utility of the subject. Although power can certainly include an 
element of this kind of violence, it is evident that power cannot be equated with 
it. As Johanna Oksala argues, violence is, for Foucault, “clearly a capacity [...], 
it is a force we exert over bodies and things, and it must therefore be 
demarcated from power.” (Oksala 2012, 74.) Foucault further explains the 
relation between power and violence as follows: 
 
”Obviously, the establishing of power relations does not exclude the use of violence 
any more than it does the obtaining of consent; no doubt, the exercise of power can 
never do without one or the other, often both at the same time. But even though 
consent and violence are instruments or results, they do not constitute the principle or 
basic nature of power. The exercise of power can produce as much acceptance as 
may be wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it 




can imagine. In itself, the exercise of power is not a violence that sometimes hides, or 
an implicitly renewed consent. It operates on the field of possibilities in which the 
behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible 
actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or 
contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids 
absolutely[.]” (EW3, 341.) 
 
It is interesting that Foucault states: ”consent and violence are instruments or 
results, they do not constitute the principle or basic nature of power.” Thus, in 
Foucault’s view, power and violence cannot be equated, but they can coexist. 
In fact they have to coexist, since there cannot be a relation of violence without 
a relation of power. As Thomas Flynn notes: ”if all violence attaches to relation 
of power, not all relations of power necessarily entail violence.” (Flynn 2005, 
244.) A relation, where the subject has no choice but to act in a certain way is, 
according to Foucault, not a power relation. As he says: ”Where the 
determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is 
not a power relationship when a man is in chains[.]” (EW3, 342) This notion is 
interesting from the perspective of violence, since it indicates that when power 
relations transform from productive to destructive, the subjects have to have a 
possibility to resist. A mindless slaughter of people who do not even have a 
theoretical possibility to escape has nothing to do with power, but by any 
standards it can have something to do with violence. In such scenes, as 
witnessed in the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, the acting capacities of 
the subjects are destroyed once and for all without asking for consent. On the 
other hand Foucault is not at all clear when he says that slavery can be a 
power relationship ”only when he [a slave] has some possible mobility, even a 
chance of escape.” (ibid) How theoretical does this possibility have to be for a 
relationship of slavery to become a power relation? If a relationship of slavery 
cannot be a power relation, can it be a relation of violence? 
 
If power and knowledge are in a relation that makes possible the establishment 
of mechanisms of domination that act through the bodies of subjects, as in the 
early psychiatric institutions, but not all knowledge-power relations are 
necessarily violent, then the essential question is: What kinds of power 
relations entail violence? Perhaps it can be fruitful to approach this question 




through an analysis of the relation of power to the dominant political 
rationalities in certain historical periods. In the next chapter I will examine the 
question of the relation between power and violence through different modes 










The concept of governing occupies a very central position in Foucault’s 
thought in the years after the release of Discipline and Punish. In the Security, 
Territory, Population lecture series Foucault traces the genealogy of the 
technique of governing all the way to the Stoic question of ”how to govern 
oneself”. He further claims that the idea was reformed in the 16th century with 
the Reformation, Counter-Reformation and the great problematic of pedagogy, 
when it starts to be posed in terms of ”how to be governed, by whom, to what 
extent, to what end, and by what methods.” (STP, 88-89.) Foucault argues that 
after the French revolution, along with thinkers like Rousseau, the notion of 
governing acquires a new meaning. (SMD, 35) The question of how to govern 
a constantly growing entity of what Foucault calls population, a mass of people 
that is an object of control through statistical means, rises to the center of 
political science. 
 
The new political theorists of the 18th century had high doubts of whether the 
king by himself, and without any help from any kind of administration, could do 
away with the new duties assigned to him. Thus, in order to govern the 
growing population, the importance of disciplining their conduct was 
highlighted. Population, which is disciplined for the common good of the 
society is easier, and most importantly, less costly, to control. (STP, 90-92) For 
this purpose, different kinds of governmental apparatuses had to be 
established. One of the most important apparatuses is that of the police, which 
is ”directed towards men’s activity, but insofar as this activity has a relationship 
to the state.” (ibid, 322) Unlike the modern police, the 18th century police was 
concerned with a wide variety of societal issues including the number of men, 
their health and activity and the immediate necessities that people need for 
living. Police, which was established as an aid for the 
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king to produce information about the population and to govern its living 
conditions, was soon established as a science. The German universities were 
pioneers in this respect, creating theories, books and manuals for 
administrators that produced an ”enormous bibliography of Polizeiwissenschaft 
in the eighteenth century.” (ibid, 318.) 
 
Foucault argues that historically the change didn’t occur from a sovereign 
society to a governmental society through a disciplinary society (STP, 106-
107.) In ”What is Critique?” Foucault claims that the question, ”How to 
govern?” was one of the most fundamental question for statesmen, economists 
and experts of all sorts, already in the 15th and 16th centuries. (PT, 44) He 
says: 
 
”It is a fundamental question which was answered by the multiplication of all the arts of 
governing - the art of pedagogy, the art of politics, the art of economics, if you will - 
and of all the institutions of government, in the wider sense of the term government  
had at the time.” (PT, 44) 
 
Although Foucault is using the term widely in his lecture series, his definition of 
governing is ambiguous. Johanna Oksala notes that in his lecture series (from 
1975 onwards) Foucault starts to prefer the word ’government’ to the word 
’power’. (Oksala 2012, 29) This can be seen, for example, in a 1976 interview, 
where Foucault seems to supplant what he calls discursive formations, one of 
the most essential functioning of power in relation to knowledge in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge with the notion of governing: ”It is a question of 
what governs statements, and the way they govern each other so as to 
constitute a set of proportions that are scientifically acceptable and, hence, 
capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures.” (P/K, 112.) 
 
In so far as governing is a specific form of power, it is not orchestrated by 
some conspirators, but has gradually emerged through the functioning of 
whole machinery built for this purpose. It seems that using the notion of 
governing is Foucault’s way to designate how power, since the 17th century at 
least, has been practiced in the realm of whole societies, on a particular target, 
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which is the population. It is actions directed towards the conduct of the 
population through various techniques. Governing is more than what Foucault 
defines as sovereign or disciplinary power, but acts as an element in both of 
them. In the next three chapters I will introduce Foucault’s account of three 
historical modes of governing and analyze their relation to violence. 
 
5.2 Sovereign power 
 
Foucault argues that, according to Machiavelli and other classical philosophers 
and theorists of sovereignty, ”the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity 
and externality, of transcendence, to his principality.” (STP, 91) He claims that 
this link between the Prince and his principality is in itself purely synthetic, 
(ibid) but in practice the Prince reigns in a territory which he has, by conquests, 
by negotiations, or by other means secured for himself. Foucault says: 
 
”[T]hese lands may be fertile or barren, they may be densely or sparsely populated, 
the people may be rich or poor, active or idle, but all these elements are only variables 
in relation to territory that is the very foundation of principality of sovereignty.” (STP, 
91) 
 
In Foucault’s view, what the classical theory of sovereignty holds true is that 
the sovereign’s responsibility concerns essentially his territories. The variables 
of this territory are secondary, although important, parts of his rule. Essentially 
sovereignty is about ownership of, first and foremost, a territory, and, secondly, 
of the ”variables”, such as his subordinates. 
 
In Foucault’s view, while territory is the sovereign’s principality, the right over 
life and death is his most fundamental and basic attribute (SMD, 240): that is, 
qualities attached to his singularity. Echoing the Roman principle of patria 
potestas - which granted the father of the family the right to ’dispose’ the life of 
his children or slaves - the sovereign has the ultimate power to decide over the 
life and death of his subordinates. (HSI, 135) Thus, for the sovereign power 
”life and death are not natural or immediate phenomena which are primal or 
radical, and which fall outside the field of power.” (SMD, 240) The king, who is 
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a living manifestation of the sovereign power, does not only possess the lawful 
right over life and death, but also practices it in the act of torture on the body of 
the one who has dared to violate the king’s property.  
 
When the sovereign power is in action, it is clear that ”[b]esides the immediate 
victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law 
represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of 
the law is the force of the prince.” (DP, 47) In sovereign power, punishment 
has essentially the function of revenge; the sovereign’s body is attacked9 and 
the king requires retribution. Foucault insists that body is not used here in a 
metaphorical sense. Historically speaking, the king’s body was a political 
reality. The king had to exist physically and be present in order for the 
monarchy to work. (P-K, 55.)  Foucault notes that the violation of the king’s 
body’s corporeal integrity had to be restored in rituals (ibid), such as the public 
execution. It is not completely clear, what, for Foucault, is the division between 
the metaphorical and physical body of the king. But he seems to maintain the 
idea that the king’s body, both in the metaphorical and in the physical sense, 
has a direct relation to the functioning of the kingdom. 
 
Quite contrary to the classical theorists of sovereignty, such as Machiavelli, 
according to Foucault, the scholastic thought – he refers to Thomas Aquinas in 
particular – attributed also the governing of the people to the sovereign. In fact, 
the sovereign was to reproduce God’s government on Earth. According to 
Foucault, Aquinas’ argument says that art is excellent as far as it imitates 
nature, which is created and governed by God. The sovereign’s art of 
governing will be excellent only as far as it imitates the order of nature, that is, 
the order of God. Just as God created nature, the sovereign founds a state or 
a city and governs it the way God governs nature. (STP, 232-233.) This stands 
in contrast with the classical theory of sovereignty, which portrays the king as a 
holder of a territory and not essentially being in charge of the people inhabiting 
that territory, except as his personal property. 
                                                 
9
 This happened quite literally in 1757, when Robert-François Damiens attempted to assassinate King 
Louis XV. Foucault dedicates the starting pages of Discipline and Punish (3-6) to vividly describe the 
king’s maiming on Damiens body in the form of torture. 




Along with the huge changes in the ”variables” of the territory – improved 
agricultural methods and vast population growth for instance – the sovereign 
mode of power mutates and acquires new forms in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
The establishment of municipalities and the changes that happened through 
the Industrious Revolution changed power relations dramatically. The king was 
still the ruler in these newly emerged societies, but during these times new 
attributes of governing began to be attached to sovereign’s personality. 
Although in Foucault’s view this notion of the sovereign, with the help of his 
administrative body of jurists and other specialist, governing people and things, 
is a clear mutation to the old mode of sovereign power, it has long historical 
roots. (STP, 236-237) 
 
I would argue that along with these new attributes, the caretaking and 
controlling of population, that were assigned to the sovereign’s personality, the 
way the king used violence towards his subordinates changed as well. As 
described before, in the classical mode of sovereign power, violence could be 
used carelessly to restore the balance in the kingdom. The king’s army spared 
no mercy when finding the offenders who dared to violate property of the 
sovereign. 
 
Along with the adaptation of the scholastic idea of the sovereign’s mission to 
govern the population, the role of violence had to reform. The subordinates 
started to be treated as something different as merely variables inhabiting the 
sovereign’s territory. Because of its tremendous economic and political cost, 
and changes in the political rationality, violence towards the subordinates had 
to be reduced to minimum. In what Foucault calls pastoral power, the role of 
the king changed from the absolute ruler who had the divine law on his side to 
the pastor of a flock whose mission is to take care of each one of its members. 
I will next try to clarify Foucault’s account of the pastoral mode of power. The 




5.3 Pastoral power 
 
In Security, Territory, Population Foucault dedicates a lot of time to make a 
genealogical analysis of pastoral power. He claims that pastoral power is a 
specific, historical mode of power, which can be traced back as far as ancient 
Egypt. 
 
”The title of shepherd (pâtre) or pastor (pasteur) of men, is one of the royal titles for the 
Babylonian monarchs. It was also a term designating the relationship of the gods, or 
god, with men. God is the pastor of men. In an Egyptian hymn, we can read something 
like this: ”Oh Ra who keeps watch while all men sleep, who seeks what is good for 
your flock...” God is the shepherd (berger) of men.” (STP, 124.) 
 
It is not at all clear what the difference is between these three terms for the 
shepherd (pâtre, pasteur and berger). It might be that Foucault makes a 
methodological division between different culturo-historical usages of the 
concept of the shepherd (berger), which he for most of the time uses to 
designate the leader of a flock of men. 
 
What Foucault means with the pastoral relationship between the shepherd and 
his flock is essentially analogous to what, in Judeo-Christian tradition at least, 
is understood to be the relation between God and men. The shepherd, a king, 
a prophet or a priest receives a flock of men directly from God, and it is God to 
whom the flock has to be returned. So essentially, what Foucault claims is that 
the pastoral relationship is about God’s relationship to men. 
(STP, 124-125.) Foucault notes, however, that the pastoral relationship does 
not hold for the Greek conception of god. 
 
”Whatever the intimacy between the Greek gods and their city, and it is not necessarily 
very great, it is never that kind of [pastoral] relationship. [...] The god is consulted; he 
or she protects and intervenes; he or she is sometimes angry, and then makes peace; 
but the Greek god never leads the men of the city like a shepherd leads his sheep.” 
(STP, 124-125.) 
 
 Historical Modes of Governing | Pastoral Power 
 
43 
The pastoral relationship between humans, of a king to his people for instance, 
seems to require recognition of a pastoral god which takes care of its flock and 
delegates this relationship to his equivalent in the human world. 
 
As Foucault argues, for the Greeks the pastoral god was a foreign idea. 
Perhaps this is why the Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, did 
not essentially base their ethics and political philosophy on the community, but 
in the character traits of the individual, who, by his virtuous actions, can affect 
the community. This is completely opposite to the later scholastic philosophy of 
the pastoral sovereign, on which the subjectivating, disciplining or normalizing 
powers of later eras were based. Indeed, Eric Paras quotes Foucault saying 
that ”[t]he subjectivation of Western man is not Greco-Roman, but Christian.” 
(Paras 2006, 101) This does not mean, however, that Foucault was in the 
opinion that Greco-Roman culture was completely unaware of the pastoral 
form of directing men. He merely wanted to show, that: 
 
”[T]he Greek thought hardly resorted to the model of shepherd to analyze political 
power and that the theme of the shepherd, so often employed and so highly valued in 
the East, was employed in Greece either as a ritual designation in ancient texts, or, in 
the classical texts, to describe ultimately local and circumscribed forms of power 
exercised, not by magistrates over the whole city, but by certain individuals over 
religious communities, in pedagogical relationships, in the care of the body, and so 
on.” (STP, 164.) 
 
The form of pastoral power is in many respects contrary to the form of 
sovereign power. Sovereign power is exercised over a territory, pastoral power 
over a moving flock; the sovereign power is exercised over the bodies, pastoral 
power mainly over souls. Unlike the sovereign, the pastor of the flock is 
dedicating his whole existence for the welfare and salvation of the flock. 
 
”Pastoral power is not merely a form of power that commands; it must also be 
prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock. Therefore, it is different 
from royal power, which demands a sacrifice from its subjects to save the throne. [...] It 
is a form of power that looks after not just the whole community but each individual in 
particular, during his entire life.” (EW3, 333.) 
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It is interesting how Foucault maintains that ”[p]astoral power is not merely a 
form of power that commands”. This formulation, however, does not rule out 
the idea that even in the pastoral power the leader of the flock can, if needed, 
force the subjects to its rule. If it is indeed true that the shepherd ”looks after 
the whole community and each individual”, it naturally follows that the 
shepherd has to have the means to know what is good for each individual. If in 
sovereign power the offender is brutally punished if he violates the king’s body, 
how is it that in pastoral power, the individual who disagrees with the imposed 
”good”, is treated? Can this treatment be violent in nature? 
 
Foucault does not offer a clear answer to the question of the role of violence in 
pastoral power. It is possible, however, to approach the question of violence in 
pastoral power similarly as the relation between discourses and violence; as 
”violence that we do to things.” In The History of Sexuality: Volume One, 
Foucault claims: ”Since the Middle Ages at least, Western societies have 
established the confession as one of the main rituals we rely on for the 
production of truth.” (HSI, 58) In pastoral power, confession as a peculiar 
technique of what he calls ”traditional technologies of the flesh” – the Christian 
technologies based on the body and defined through the Lateran Council –  
offers the means to set the flock to a certain subject position. Foucault claims 
that the Christian technique of confession has become ”one of the West’s most 
highly valued techniques for producing the truth.” 
 
”The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and love relations[;] […] one confesses one’s crimes, 
one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles[.] One confesses 
in public and private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor[.] One confesses 
– or is forced to confess. When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal 
imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat.” (HSI, 59.) 
 
He uses sexuality as an example to argue that the relation of the subjects to 
the ”truth” of sexuality requires ”the social body as a whole, and virtually all of 
its individuals, to place themselves under surveillance.” (ibid, 116) In the ritual 
of the confession every individual is thus forced to examine her sexuality, 
reflecting it against the ”truth” about herself, defined through the social body. 
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This is part of what Foucault calls ’normalization’, which I will analyze more 
closely in the next chapter. 
 
The role of violence in pastoral power is certainly as ambiguous as Foucault’s 
account on the relation between discourses and violence. If violence destroys 
the productive capacities of the subject, confession falls to the regime of 
violence only as far as it is forced out of the subject by directly violent means. 
This could be the case for instance if a person is tortured in order to obtain a 
confession. To prove that the gentler ways of seducing or persuading the 
person to confess are violent is a harder task. The production of truth without 
destroying the productive capacities of the subject is, according to Foucault, 
”merely” a power relation. He says: ”[Power] operates on the field of 
possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It 
is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes 
easier or more difficult.” (EW3, 341.) Thus, I would argue that in pastoral 
power, the means of confession can take a violent turn if the subjects consent 
of producing the ”truth” about himself is not achieved by gentler means. But, 
opposed to sovereign power, there is clearly no rationality of violence inscribed 
in the exercise of the power itself. That does not mean however, that 
implementing certain techniques, such as confession, could not have violent 
outcomes. 
 
So far I have examined Foucault’s concept of governing and introduced the 
sovereign and pastoral modes of power. I have also shown how violence is, 
historically connected to governing. In the next chapter I will proceed to 
examine Foucault’s concept of bio-politics. It has a direct relation to the 
pastoral mode of power, but it is more complete system of governing and 





In his 1975–1976 lecture series ”Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault 
introduces the audience to what he was contemporaneously working on in 
writing The History of Sexuality: 
 
”Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth 
century: a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary. This technology 
of power does not exclude the [...] disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, 
integrate it, modify it to some extent, [...] embedding itself in existing disciplinary 
techniques. This new technique does not simply do away with the disciplinary 
technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it 
has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments. Unlike 
disciplinary, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied 
not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, 
to man-as-species.” (SMD, 242.) 
 
Foucault calls this bio-power or bio-politics. Foucault uses these terms in a 
similar manner, which justifies the assumption that bio-power and bio-politics 
essentially refer to the same phenomenon. According to Kai Alhanen, Foucault 
links the emergence of bio-politics to a slow historical process that 
was influenced by series of events, such as an upward trend in population 
growth and development in agricultural methods. (Alhanen 2012, 139) The 
capitalist economy required more cost-efficient means of production and more 
efficient placing of workers in the productive machinery. At the same time the 
newly emerged sciences of biology and medicine made possible detailed and 
calculative interventions to biological life-processes. Alhanen claims: ”With bio-
politics human life became an object of efficient and meticulous governing in 
western societies.” (Alhanen 2012, 139.) With its emphasis on taking care of 
an entire population, bio-politics resembles the pastoral mode of power, but the 
historical emergence of bio-politics brought along something completely new 
as well. Instead of obedience in the form of subjection to the king’s will or 
docility in the face of the disciplinary system, the aim of bio-politics is 
normalization (normalisation). 




As an example of early forms of bio-politics and its normalizing function, 
Foucault traces the genealogy of what he calls scientia sexualis, a complete 
and thorough control of sexuality. His approach challenges the commonly held 
view that during the Victorian age sex was entirely repressed and is only now 
slowly being liberated. Instead his working hypothesis in The History of 
Sexuality is that the bourgeois, capitalist society ”did not confront sex with a 
fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation entire 
machinery for producing true discourses concerning it.” (HSI, 69.) 
 
Historically, the transformation of sex into discourse in the 19th century 
introduced legal sanctions against perversions and pleasures that didn’t have a 
direct relation with reproduction, and the introduction of educational and 
medical discourses into the sexual domain. Sex was no more merely 
dependent on the Christian thematic of confession and sin. 
 
”Through pedagogy, medicine, and economics, it made sex not only a secular concern 
but a concern of the state as well[.] [I]t expanded along three axes: that of pedagogy, 
having as its objective the specific sexuality of children; that of medicine, whose 
objective was the sexual physiology peculiar to women; and last, that of demography, 
whose objective was the spontaneous or concerted regulation of births. Thus the ”sin 
of youth”, ”nervous disorders,” and ”frauds against procreation” […] designate three 
privileged areas of this new technology.” (HSI, 166-117.) 
 
To highlight the contrast between the Western and the oriental approach to 
sexuality, Foucault makes a division between ars erotica, the oriental art of 
initiating and guiding to the pleasures and mysteries of sexuality and the 
Western scientia sexualis, which is essentially about establishing a generally 
acceptable, scientifically articulable, true discourse of sexuality. (ibid, 36) 
 
In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault talks about the normalization of 
technical and medical knowledge. He argues that in the 18th century, in order 
to attain the goals of selection, normalization, hierarchicalization and 
centralization of knowledges certain institutions and projects, such as the 
hospital and the mental asylum, were established. These institutions are run by 
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experts from various fields, and their aim is to figure out how to impose 
practices of standardized, correct way of living to people. (SMD, 181.) Foucault 
says: “At the end of the eighteenth century [...] the mechanisms [of power] are 
adjusted to phenomena of population, to the biological or biosociological 
processes characteristic of human masses.” (SMD, 250) 
 
In Security, Territory, Population Foucault further develops his ideas 
concerning the mechanism of normalization. He argues that although 
disciplinary power uses partly the same mechanism, the bio-political 
functioning of power is more adjusted and covers a wider segment of 
population. (STP, 56-57) Thus, the exercise of power is not limited to the public 
domain, as in sovereign power, in which the law guarantees a social sphere, 
such as the family, where king has no influence. Instead, through 
normalization, bio-politics penetrates deep into the souls of the people. In a 
bio-political society the behavioral patterns of subjects are affected, their 
thoughts and desires shaped. The subject is forced to meet the demands of a 
correct way of being a member of the society. Nealon argues: 
 
“To use a Foucaultian economic figure, the sovereign power of the king was very 
inefficient “wholesale” mode of power’s distribution to the socius (early modern 
spectacles of execution and torture were expensive and not particularly effective in 
keeping royal order.) Discipline, by contrast, discovered and deployed a much more 
economical and effective “retail” power over individual bodies at particular, 
transversally linked sites of training (the family, the school, the clinic, the factory, the 
army.) Biopower, then, goes one step beyond discipline in the intensification of power, 
working on individuals “really and directly”[.] (Nealon 2008, 46.) 
 
Thus, bio-political normalization takes the pastoral confession and disciplinary 
training one step further. In pastoral power, for example the pagans could quite 
easily avoid the grip of the Christian “technologies of flesh” and the confession. 
In a disciplinary society the individuals with permanently disabled bodies would 
not be subjected to disciplinary training. Although both of these modes of 
power radiate their influence to the whole social strata, bio-political 
normalization seeks, by definition, no restrictions, in so far as its subjects can 
be defined as belonging to the species of human. 




In order to underline the primacy of the norm, Foucault introduces the concept 
of ‘normation’ (normation) to characterize the difference between disciplinary 
and bio-political normalization. (STP, 57.) The disciplinary power of normation 
breaks down individuals in order to make them visible from a general mass of 
people. It defines the best actions for achieving a particular result and modifies 
individuals to achieve this result. The norm, an ideal model, such as the best 
way to operate a machine in a factory, is constructed in terms of the result, for 
example the maximal amount of produced goods per time unit. The normation 
in disciplinary power thus functions to classify individuals as normal or 
abnormal according to their ability to reach the norm, the best achievable 
result. But, as Foucault underlines, “it is not the normal and the abnormal that 
is fundamental and primary in disciplinary normalization, it is the norm.” (STP, 
57.) So, what disciplinary normation does is that it molds bodies and their 
actions to a certain pattern, defined and constructed by specialist apparatuses 
such as experts in the field of factory work. Along with the factory Foucault 
often uses the military apparatus as an example. When a detachment is in 
formation, the individual merges into the whole like a cog in a perfectly 
functioning machine. 
 
As we can see, for example with scientia sexualis, the process of bio-political 
normalization is something quite different. The docile body ceases to be the 
main target of power. Instead bio-politics focuses “on the species body, the 
body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of biological 
processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy 
and longevity[.]” (HSI, 139) When the bio-political mode of power is in 
operation, the normalization is not in any ways restricted to institutions such as 
the factory or the military barracks, but is practiced on the whole population. 
During a series of mutations and intensifications, the sovereign’s power over 
life and death has “now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies 
and the calculated management of life.” (ibid, 139-140) 
 
In my opinion, it is hardly a surprise that it was precisely the topic of sex that 
was among the first fields, along with demography, to encounter the 
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mechanisms of bio-politics, since it has everything to do with the management 
of life. In order to weed out sexual practices that do not have to do with 
reproduction and to embrace those that do, it is necessary to construct a 
scientific truth about sexuality. 
 
I would argue that from a bio-political viewpoint the exclusion of non-productive 
sexual practices aims to foster the reproduction of the individuals for the needs 
of the society. As I have noted, Foucault places the birth of scientia sexualis to 
the 18th and 19th centuries, to the precise time when the demographic shifts in 
populations, as well as the implementation of new technologies of production 
in the wake of Industrious Revolution, demanded more efficient placing of 
workers in the productive machinery. The medical discourse, which produced 
the discourse of sexuality, was partly an effort to answer to the question of how 
to improve the health and longevity of population as a whole and the workers 
in particularly. In an article titled ”The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth 
Century”, Foucault says: 
 
”The great eighteenth-century demographic upswing in Western Europe, the necessity 
of co-ordinating and integrating it into the apparatus of production and the urgency of 
controlling it with finer and more adequate power mechanisms cause ’population’, with 
its numerical variables of space and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not 
only as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, modification 
etc. The project of a technology of population begins to be sketched: demographic 
estimates, the calculations of pyramid of ages, different life expectations and levels of 
mortality, studies of the reciprocal relations of growth of wealth and growth of 
population, various measures of incitement to marriage and procreation, the 
development of forms of education and professional training. […] The biological traits 
of a population become relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes 
necessary to organise around them an apparatus which will ensure not only their 
subjection but the constant increase of their utility. (P/K, 172.) 
 
Thus in a bio-political society the normalization of the subjects is part of an 
intensification process, which increases the utility of the subjects and widens 
the scope of power. By making interventions in the biological life processes, it 
is not only possible to direct the actions of the subjects in relation to the norm, 
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but to define whole populations in terms of cost-efficient economic 
management. 
 
So far I have introduced bio-politics as an essentially modern form of power 
with its wide-reaching scope and unique aims. I argued that the bio-political 
mode of power differs from sovereign and disciplinary power, but includes 
elements from both of them, and that the difference can clearly be seen in the 
difference between disciplinary ‘normation’ and bio-political ‘normalization’. 
This division, although not used by Foucault in Discipline and Punish and 
History of Sexuality: Volume One, was introduced in order to contrast the 
differences between the disciplinary and bio-political modes of power. Next I 
will analyze in more detail the connection between bio-politics and the 
economy, which will bring me back to the previously introduced notions of cost 
and intensity. 
 
Johanna Oksala claims that the bio-political mechanism is linked with a liberal 
notion of the economy. (Oksala 2012, 125) There is no sovereign body to 
guarantee the functioning of the society. Along with the intensification process, 
which has made power more wide-reaching and cost-efficient, the sovereign 
loses influence to experts who have to produce the truth of the “natural laws”, 
which have to be respected or manipulated to ensure society’s prosperity. But 
on the fundamental level, the liberal economy is based on the fact that there is 
no guarantee for what happens in the economy. This is in high contrast with 
the sovereign’s knowledge, which is almost divine in its certainty. Referring to 
Adam Smith’s famous concept, she argues that “the invisible hand is invisible 
precisely because there can be no totalizing sovereign view.” (ibid) 
 
This brings me back to the notion that economic aspects are closely linked to 
power’s functionings. The liberalization of economy from the authority of the 
careless ‘visible hand’ of the sovereign has essentially let the exercise of 
power intensify. The Western societies have thus slowly, accompanied by 
numerous draws and setbacks, shifted from a recklessly extravagant, violent 
and authoritative form of sovereign power to the highly cost-efficient, life-
preserving and calculative bio-political form of power, in which the governing of 
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the population is of key significance. One might argue that these developments 
are elements of progress and should be embraced. In Foucault’s view, these 
kinds of arguments are, if not false, at least wrongly constituted. 
 
“’I adopt the methodological precaution and the radical but unaggressive scepticism 
which makes it a principle not to regard the point in time where we are now standing 
as the outcome of a teleological progression which it would be one’s business to 
reconstruct historically: that scepticism regarding ourselves and what we are, our here 
and now, which prevents one from assuming that what we have is better than - or 
more than - in the past. [...] And I don’t say that humanity doesn’t progress. I say that it 
is a bad method to pose the problem as: ‘How is it that we have progressed?’ The 
problem is: how do things happen? And what happens now is not necessarily better or 
more advanced, or better understood, than what happened in the past.” (P-K, 49-50.) 
 
Foucault does not pose the question of power in terms of good and bad, but 
instead in terms of existence. In my opinion he is a typical Enlightenment 
thinker in the sense, that in order to even reach to the source of something 
called ethics, we must first thoroughly understand through what kinds of 
developments we have arrived to the present. This does not mean, however, 
that Foucault would have dismissed the obvious problems arising along with 
power’s process of intensification. I would argue that for Foucault the individual 
misery caused by the exercise of power is anti-essential, an outcome rather 
than a determined essence of power. Quoting Marx with a free hand, Foucault 
argues that when faced with the problem of workers’ misery, he: 
 
“[R]efused the customary explanation which regarded this misery as the effect of a 
naturally rare cause of a concerted theft. And he said substantially: given what 
capitalist production is, [...] it cannot help but cause misery. Capitalism’s raison d´être 
is not to starve the workers but it cannot develop without starving them.” (PPC, 113) 
 
Foucault approaches the dominating or violent effects of power in a similar 
manner. For him, demonizing power by considering it mainly in terms of its 
repressive function misses the point. As Foucault insists, when power 
functions, it is productive. However, as I have already shown, violence plays a 
role in all historical modes of power. The role is mirrored through the 
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hegemonic political rationalities. I will now proceed to analyze the relations 
among these rationalities, violence and the subject.




6 Violence and Political Rationalities 
 
6.1 Foucault, Arendt, Žižek  
 
Although Foucault uses the term ‘violence’ considerably often, especially in his 
early works such as History of Madness and Discipline and Punish, he never 
gave a crystal clear definition of it. Considering how strongly power is linked to 
violence for such classical theorists of power as Hobbes, who Foucault ends 
up opposing in many instances, it is quite puzzling why Foucault does not give 
violence the same kind of analytical treatment as he gives to other power 
related and historically important terms, such as ‘the sovereign’, ‘the state’ or 
‘war’. However, as I have already shown, Foucault does not leave the concept 
of violence completely without attention. 
 
As mentioned in the opening chapter, violence, although arguably an important 
and widely used concept in modern political discourse, has been receiving 
quite little philosophical attention. Hannah Arendt’s was one of the few 20th 
century philosophers who devoted a whole book to the topic. For her, violence 
is purely instrumental in its character, a tool for attaining certain political aims. 
Arendt maintains that power and violence are opposites; where one rules, the 
other is absent. She maintains that violence can destroy power, but is utterly 
unable to create it. Thus, as she insists, phenomenologically violence is close 
to strength. The implementations of violence are tools for “multiplying natural 
strength until, in the last stage of their development, they can substitute for it.” 
(Arendt 1970, 56; 46-47.) 
 
Johanna Oksala’s recent book Foucault, Politics, and Violence is, as the title 
suggests, a study on the relations between politics and violence from the 
perspective of Foucault’s thought. She argues that the justification of violence, 
which she vaguely defines as intentional bodily harm, is what is usually 
questioned, not the definition of violence itself. (Oksala 2012, 8-9) Violence is 
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taken as it is and considered to be beyond philosophical analysis. She takes 
as a starting point the Foucauldian notion that our reality is constructed 
through political struggle and is always contestable. Thus also the concept of 
violence, its rationality and necessity in the political sphere can be questioned. 
She does not share Arendt’s universal and ahistorical definition of violence as 
a purely instrumental form of strength. Instead she claims that violence has a 
culturally and historically specific rationality, which has to be studied in order to 
be able to criticize practices of violence in certain power networks. (Oksala 
2012, 8-9.) 
 
Slavoj Žižek offers a slightly different kind of analysis in his 2008 work on 
violence. He situates violence in the framework of the capitalist economy. He 
takes a kind of neo-Marxist standpoint, claiming that what he calls ‘objective 
violence’ is a result of the historical developments of capitalism and, in fact, 
intrinsic in its operations. Žižek opposes objective violence to ‘subjective 
violence’, which is the form of violence that always has an agent in operation, a 
“monstrous” subject who engages in acts of violence. He claims that the 
attention directed towards rapes, assaults, murders and other acts of 
subjective violence in media and popular culture is producing a hypocritical 
and highly subject-based discourse on violence and, perhaps intentionally, 
hiding the real “monster”. (Žižek 2009, 10) According to Žižek, in order to figure 
out how violence is working and what kind of misery it produces, we would 
have to focus our attention to the “self-propelling metaphysical dance of 
capital” wherein “resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, 
much more uncanny than any direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence, 
but is purely ‘objective’, systemic, anonymous.” (ibid, 11) 
 
With his idea of power as an intrinsic element of all social relations, Foucault 
stands in a strikingly different position from that of Arendt. On the other hand 
Foucault’s high reservations towards ideology as an explaining factor do not 
lend support to Žižek’s claim that capitalist ideology in itself produces violence 
by its pure functioning.10 Oksala, who disagrees with Arendt’s idea of the 
                                                 
10
 In a 1976 interview Foucault gives three reasons for why the notion of ideology appears to him difficult 
to make use of: ”The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else that 
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instrumental nature of violence and adapts a considerably narrower definition 
of violence than Žižek, bases her reflections mostly on Foucault’s late works, 
especially the Collège de France lecture series. In my opinion, the lecture 
series present only a small, although significant, portion of the sources 
available on the topic of violence. In order to contrast and highlight certain 
aspects in Foucault’s conception of violence, I will in the next chapter use the 
thought of Arendt, Žižek and Oksala as analytical reference points. 
 
6.2 Violence, Politics and The Subject 
 
The role of subject in Foucault’s thought is arguably very central. Foucault 
says it very clearly in the first chapters in his 1982 article “The Subject and 
Power”: 
 
“I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last 
twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of 
the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” (EW3, 
326) 
 
Foucault then makes the famous tripartite analysis of his work. In the first part 
of his work (The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge) he dealt 
with the objectivizing operations of sciences, such as linguistics, economics or 
biology. The second part (The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish, The 
History of Sexuality: Volume One) consists of studying the objectivizing of the 
subject through dividing practices, such as defining the sick and healthy or the 
“criminals and the ‘good boys’” (EW, 326). 
 
                                                                                                                                             
is supposed to count as truth. [...] The second drawback is the concept of ideology refers, I think 
necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position 
relative to something that functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, and so on. 
(EW3, 119.) 
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In the third part (the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality) Foucault, 
through the example of sexuality, tries to figure out the way “a human being 
turns him- or herself into a subject. [...] [H]ow men have learned to recognize 
themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality.’” (ibid, 327.) Johanna Oksala argues, 
following Foucault, that “[a]ll identities and subject positions are constituted 
through practices of power and knowledge. Rather than existing between 
subjects with predetermined identities, power relations are constitutive of the 
subjects themselves.” (Oksala 2012, 74.) The question is, then: what, if 
anything, is violent in this process? Perhaps an answer could be found in 
examining Foucault’s analogy of the machine. 
 
Foucault uses the analogy of the machine in several occasions to describe the 
ideal functioning of the disciplinary system. In Discipline and Punish he says: 
 
“The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a 
thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. [...] Thanks to 
the techniques of surveillance, the ‘physics’ of power, the hold over body, operate 
according to laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, 
screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or 
violence.” (DP, 177.) 
 
Gilles Deleuze argues that the machine is not just a metaphor or an analogy 
for Foucault. He says: “Machines are social before being technical. Or, rather, 
there is a human technology which exists before material technology.” 
(Deleuze 2010, 34.) What Deleuze says, basically, is that material technology 
is produced for a certain social purpose and, in fact, designed and 
manufactured in a particular social process. Foucault refers to this in a 
passage in Discipline and Punish: 
 
“Compared with [...] the blast furnaces or the steam engine, panopticism has received 
little attention. [...] But it would be unjust to compare the disciplinary techniques with 
such inventions as the steam engine[.] They are much less; and yet, in a way, they are 
much more.” (DP, 225) 
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The relation between technologies of power and the subject is an interesting 
one. From the point of view of the subject, the formation and application of new 
technologies functions in a similar manner as the formation and application of 
expert knowledge. They both define the subject without letting the subject 
influence these definitions. 
 
Charlie Chaplin’s 1936 silent film Modern Times depicts the struggle of an 
individual in an utterly disciplinary society. The movie has a scene, where, 
quite literally, the clumsy main character gets swallowed by colossal 
machinery. Curiously, although obviously in agony, the character is trying to 
perform his duty as an employee, screwing the nuts of the machinery while 
being twisted by the giant cogwheels. Miraculously he gets rescued from the 
guts of the machine, but, as a result, suffers a nervous breakdown and is 
hospitalized.11 Could it be that Foucault perceives subjects of power as cogs in 
a colossal machine? As long as the subjects co-operate, no violence is 
needed. But if they refuse to function according to the norm, they will pay the 
price of being “swallowed by the machine”, labeled an outcast or locked up in 
an institution; and the machinery continues to work mercilessly in its quest for 
more cost-efficient ways of exercising power. This interpretation comes very 
close to what Žižek means by ‘objective violence’. There are no faces to be 
recognized behind the operations of the violent machine, because it is the 
stone cold rationality of extracting more profit that upholds the system and 
produces death and agony.12 Although, according to Flynn, “Foucault’s 
account holds quite well for ‘structural’ violence,” (Flynn 2005, 258) which is 
roughly what Žižek means with his notion of objective violence, this 
comparison is perhaps too hasty. In order to better account for the violent side 
of power relations, a closer look at its rationality has to be taken. 
 
                                                 
11
 Interestingly, according to Eric Flom, the movie was inspired by Chaplin’s concerns about the 
economic chaos of the 1930s as well as a conversation with Mahatma Gandhi, who condemned 
”machinery with only consideration of profit.” (Flom 1997, 80) 
12
 Žižek ironically points out that the ‘faces’ of capitalism never show the grim side of its actions: “The 
same philanthropists who give millions for AIDS or education in tolerance have ruined the lives of 
thousands through financial speculation and thus created the conditions for the rise of the very 
intolerance that is being fought.” (Žižek 2008, 31.) 
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According to Flynn, Foucault was persistent in uncovering the “immanent logic” 
or “rationality” of dominating, destructive practices “while calling for the names 
of those responsible for fostering such practices and urging us to resist” (Flynn 
2005, 245.) As Foucault says in ”What is Critique?”: 
 
”The identification of the acceptability of a system cannot be dissociated from 
identifying what made it difficult to accept: its arbitrary nature in terms of knowledge, its 
violence in terms of power, in short, its energy. Hence it is necessary to take 
responsibility for this structure in order to better account for its artifices.” (PT, 62) 
 
Foucault seems to argue that since power is everywhere and it is practiced on 
every one of us, as long as we conduct accordingly or co-operate, we are all 
responsible for societal structures that foster destructive practices of violence. 
The first step would be to uncover the political rationalities through which these 
practices are implemented; the second would be to refuse to co-operate, to 
resist. I will elaborate on this point in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Violence functions in power relations. According to Flynn it is ”with that species 
of power which Foucault calls ”domination” and which we might label 
”negative” power that violence seems necessarily associated.” (Flynn 2005, 
245) As Western societies have evolved from the highly dominating and 
excessively violent sovereign power to a machine-like disciplinary power and 
further towards the normalizing mode of power called bio-politics, practices of 
violence have changed as well. 
 
The historical evolution of machines roughly depicts the change in the violent 
practices of domination. The machines of ancient regimes were in the hands of 
a few, they were crude in design and used an excessive amount of energy in 
proportion to their output. With the invention of the steam and combustion 
engines, the use of machines spread to new fields, becoming more 
complicated and able to perform vast tasks with less energy. Modern machines 
are everywhere, requiring little energy and being able to perform very 
complicated tasks with an astonishing accuracy. I suggest that the use of 
violence has gone through a similar kind of development. In the sovereign 
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power, excessive amounts of violence are used towards a few hapless 
individuals in such instances as the public executions. In the disciplinary mode 
of power, practices of violence become less severe but wider in their reach, 
such as slapping disobedient pupils or imposing electric shocks on mental 
patients. Along with bio-politics physical violence has become too costly to be 
exercised on subjects directly. Although, as mentioned previously, it is difficult 
to locate the role violence plays in bio-politics, perhaps the normalization of 
subjects can have violent outcomes. One example of this could be the recent 
attempts to reduce the risk of recidivism of pedophiles by offering them a 
possibility to have their reproductive capabilities destroyed through chemical 
castration. 
 
Already since the 1970s, along with the neoliberal as well as the anarchist 
movements, the status and rationality of the welfare state has been 
challenged. Foucault wrote in 1979: 
 
”[W]hat is currently challenged, and from a great many perspectives, is almost always 
the state: the unlimited growth of the state, its omnipotence, its bureaucratic 
development, the state with the seeds of fascism it contains, the state’s inherent 
violence beneath its social welfare paternalism[.]” (BB, 187.) 
 
In her work, Johanna Oksala analyzes Foucault’s account of neoliberal political 
rationality. She points out that while this critique aims at the ”inherent violence” 
of the state adopting neoliberal policies, it does not automatically lead to the 
reduction of state violence. (Oksala 2012, 137.) She says that the strong point 
in Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism in Birth of Biopolitics is that it clearly 
shows how it is not the reduction of the state that neoliberal policies are aiming 
at, but a certain way of governing. (ibid, 138.) 
 
”The government should not interfere with the effects of the market, nor should it 
correct its destructive consequences for society retroactively. It has to intervene in the 
very being of society in order to make competition the dominant principle for guiding 
human behavior. It has to construct legal, institutional, and cultural conditions that give 
competition between enterprises and entrepreneurial conduct maximal range. It also 
has to maintain these conditions through effective policing.” (Oksala, 141.) 




The political rationality of neoliberalism forces the players to stay in the 
economic game and to accept competition as their guiding principle. ”For the 
economic rationality of market mechanisms to extend maximally throughout 
society, the possibilities for engaging in practices with alternative, non-
economic rationalities must be restricted, by violent means if necessary.” 
(Oksala 2012, 141.)  
 
Neoliberalism attacks what it deems irrational or acting against its political 
rationality. What is labeled as a freedom fight against ”the state’s inherent 
violence beneath its social welfare paternalism” is in fact a mechanism to 
impose the principles of competition and cost-benefit calculations on everyone, 
not just within the nation state, but along with the processes of globalization all 
around the globe. Foucault did not live to witness this triumph of neoliberal 
policies. But as Oksala says: ”Almost thirty years after its expanding 
application, Foucault’s topic and his insights appear farsighted, almost 
prophetic.” (Oksala 2012, 137) Oksala does groundbreaking work in analyzing 
the role of violence in modern societies. Considering the huge role of 
neoliberal policies in contemporary political reality, more analysis on the 
connection between neoliberal political rationality and violence is certainly 
needed. 
 
This brief detour on neoliberal policies brings me back to the trembling voice of 
the Soviet dissident. He said: ”For all the claim that our social and economic 
organization lacked rationality, we found ourselves facing I don’t know if it’s too 
much or too little reason, but in any case surely facing too much power.” (PT, 
54.) Although Foucault’s conception of violence does not have a clear 
continuum and he uses the concept in very ambiguous ways indeed, I have 
argued that it is useful to approach the Foucauldian history of violence in the 
Western societies through the history of its economic rationality. Although it is 
clear that this approach leaves open many questions concerning the different 
cultural and political meanings of violence, it can, in my opinion shed light on 
certain aspects of it. As I have shown, when power intensifies, the costs of its 
exercise reduce and the scope of its reach widens. In the process, the 
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politically and economically costly practices of direct, physical violence reduces 
and becomes reserved to specific areas. At the same time, the subject has 
been interwoven as a part of an extremely complicated power network. In 
contemporary Western societies, the subject seldom has to face the ”negative” 
side of power, its ”ugly face”, if the subject takes care of her productive 




Frantz Fanon, an Algerian psychoanalyst and a fierce critic of colonial 
practices, wrote in 1963: 
 
“Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated 
by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives 
the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, 
there’s nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There’s 
nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and 
down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly 
marking time.” (Fanon 2001, 118.) 
 
Fanon repeats the message of the Algerian revolutionary group Front de 
Libération Nationale, asserting that “colonialism loosens its hold when the knife 
is at its throat.” (Fanon 2001, 48.) He firmly believed that there was no 
rationality behind colonialism, it is “not a thinking machine”, but instead 
“violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater 
violence.” (ibid) Thus, for Fanon, the struggle to free the Algerian people from 
the grip of the “negative” dominating power of the colonial machine had to 
happen by imposing well-planned violent strategies upon the ones responsible 
for fostering and upholding colonial practices. In short, for Fanon, colonialism 
was violent machinery that had to be destroyed once and for all. 
 
For Foucault resistance must take quite a different form. Without 
understanding that every kind of power relation has a rationality behind it, one 
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can never get rid of the domination caused by it. In a 1978 interview Foucault 
remarks: 
 
“I don’t believe that this question of “who exercises the power?” can be resolved 
unless the other qustion [sic] “how does it happen?” is resolved at the same time. Of 
course we have to show who those in charge are, we know that we have to turn, let us 
say, to deputies, ministers, principal private secretaries, etc., etc. But this is not the 
important issue, for we know perfectly well that even if we reach the point of 
designating exactly all those people, all those “decision-makers,” we will still not really 
know why and how the decision was made, how it came to be accepted by everybody, 
and how it is that it hurts a particular category of person[.]” (PPC, 103-104.) 
 
Trying to seek answers to the question ‘how’ in relation to the question of 
power is, for Foucault, what philosophy is essentially about. He himself never 
wanted to take the mantle of what Lenin would have called revolutionary 
intelligentsia, who would first locate the violence and excesses of power and 
then, with fierce conviction, lead the revolution to overthrow the regime. 
Foucault did not see intellectual as any kind of prophet or a paragon of virtues. 
 
“I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the 
inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the 
openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly 
where he is heading nor what will he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the 
present; who wherever he moves, contributes to posing the question of knowing 
whether the revolution is worth the trouble, and what kind (I mean what revolution and 
what trouble), it being understood that the question can be answered only by those 
who are willing to risk their lives to bring it about.” (PPC, 124.) 
 
The fact that Foucault says: “the question [of revolution] can be answered only 
by those who are willing to risk their lives to bring it about,” indicates that he 
understood that resisting a violent regime can possibly be a deadly affair. This 
would indicate that resistance eventually boils down to the subjects, who, in 
the light shed by philosophy, have to make the choice whether or not “the 
revolution is worth the trouble”. 
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Foucauldian philosophy encourages us all to find out whether we are ready to 
pay the price of “speaking the truth” about ourselves and others and our place 
in the networks of power. Foucault says: 
 
At what price can subjects speak the truth about themselves? At what price can 
subjects speak the truth about themselves as mad persons? At the price of 
constituting the mad person as absolutely other, paying not only the theoretical price 
but also an institutional and even an economic price[.] An ensemble of complex, 
staggered elements where you find that institutional game-playing, class relations, 
professional conflicts, modalities of knowledge and, finally, a whole history of the 
subject and of reason are involved.” (EW2, 444.) 
 
Although this kind of revolutionary talk might sound like distant echoes from 
the 60s, I would argue that the question is indeed essential to anyone who, 
also in contemporary Western societies, is willing to challenge the normative 
rules of the society. The question of the price of ”speaking the truth about 
themselves” presents itself very vividly to those individuals who are, for 
example, taking part in civil disobedience or activities that run on the borderline 
of criminality, such as squatting houses or refusing the military service. 
 
As Oksala argues: ”Foucault drew a distinction between power and violence, 
but argued that the rationalities upholding practices of domination were often 
compatible with practices of violence.” (Oksala 2012, 12) Answering violence 
with violence, as Fanon suggested, would merely mean accepting its rationality 
and trying to develop the practices of revolutionary violence, the ”good” 
violence, to such intensity that the regime would have no other choice but to 
surrender. Now I come back, once again, to the Soviet dissident veteran and 
his poetic question: ”Was it all that violence against our enemies that killed our 
revolution?” I would answer to this question in rather Foucauldian terms: ”Yes, 
violence perhaps helped you to overthrow the tsarist regime. But since you 
never questioned the rationalities upholding the dominating practices and in 
fact embraced many of them, you never managed to cut the head of the king. 
And that, dear comrade, killed your revolution.





In this thesis I have introduced and analyzed Foucault’s conceptions of power 
and violence. By conceptual analysis, I tried to gain an understanding of the 
different political rationalities and their relation to power and violence. First, I 
analyzed power through the concept of force and defined power as a set of 
actions on possible actions, as a relation, which directs the forces, or acting 
capacities, of subjects. I then showed how, by approaching power through the 
concepts of cost and intensity, we can discover the economic aspect of power 
relations. I argued that power produces, or that it is productive in itself, and 
opposed it to violence, which is unproductive, or destructive. 
 
Continuing to approach power through the concept of cost, I applied the 
concept to analyze how, by depending on Foucault’s historical analysis, it is 
possible to argue that violence has a certain political and economic cost, which 
is defined through the political rationality in question. Following Jeffrey 
Nealon’s analysis, I argued that power has had the tendency to intensify, to 
become more wide-reaching and effective. In order to clarify how the concept 
of cost and the process of intensifying are connected to the historical changes 
in the use of violence, I introduced Foucault’s account of four historical modes 
of governing: sovereign power, disciplinary power, pastoral power and bio-
politics. To sum these developments up, I used the analogy of the 
development of machines, from being crude in design and in the hands of a 
few to being extremely sophisticated and practically everywhere. I argued that 
in a similar manner the use of violence has developed from being excessive 
and brutal (the sovereigns ”Right of Death”) to normative and life-preserving 
(the bio-political “Power over Life”). 
 
The relation between power and violence in Foucault’s thought is certainly an 
ambiguous one. As Thomas Flynn says: ”If all violence attaches to relation of 
power, not all relations of power necessarily entail violence.” (Flynn 2005, 
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244.) In this thesis I have tried to clarify these relations by approaching them 
through Foucault’s account of historical developments of different political 
rationalities. Nevertheless, my analysis leaves many questions open. When 
exactly does a power relation turn to violence? What kinds of acts of violence 
can be understood as state-sponsored and state-sanctioned institutional forms 
of violence” (Hanssen 2000, 10)? What is the role of agency in all of this? 
Considering the importance of violence in modern societies, more 
philosophical research on the topic is needed. 
 
Perhaps Foucault’s dark joke is indeed to be taken seriously, and the decisive 
test for the philosophers of the modern era is our aptitude to make sense of 
massacres. As we have entered the 21st century, which some thinkers call 
postmodern, the grim shadow of the century of totalitarian regimes is fading. 
Instead, the triumph of neoliberal policies, for which Foucault did not live to 
witness, opens a new field of investigation. In order to understand the 
phenomena of violence in our contemporary societies, the studies on the 
thought of Foucault will be more important than ever. 
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